Federalist 10 Paraphrased
The Federalist Number 10: Can Republican Government Control Divisive Party Factions? paraphrased into Modern English
by James Madison, November 23, 1787.
To: the people of New York,
Of all the many advantages that a well-designed Union provides, the one that should be most accurately pointed out is its tendency to break up and manage the violence of factions [pressure groups with their own agenda]. Anyone who welcomes popular governments [pure democracy] dreads the future of such governments when he reflects on their tendency to fall into this dangerous evil. Because of his dread, he will appreciate a plan that respects the principles of democracy while also providing a cure for factions. Popular governments [pure democracies] have perished everywhere because of the fatal diseases of instability, injustice, and confusion that were introduced into public discussion. Yet popular governments continue to be the most popular and most productive topics that the enemies of liberty use in their misleading speeches. The earlier American constitutions [Mayflower Compact, Articles of Confederation, state constitutions] made some valuable improvements on democratic governments, but they are still faulty. Only the most biased person would say that those constitutions averted the danger of violent factions as much as they hoped and expected. Our most respectful and virtuous citizens, as well as Christians, churches, and people who value public freedom and personal liberty are all complaining that our governments are too unstable. They protest that while opposing parties fight, the public good is neglected, and legislation is all too often decided by the stronger force of an overbearing majority with an agenda instead of according to the standards of justice and the rights of the smaller group. We might wish that these complaints had no basis, but we can't deny that they have a point when we see the evidence of obvious facts. When we consider the situation honestly, we will find that some of our distresses are not the government's fault. At the same time, other causes by themselves can't account for many of our most severe afflictions, especially not the increasing and overruling distrust of public meetings and the concern about individual rights that people are denouncing all over the continent. These must be mostly, if not totally, the effects of the instability and injustice caused by our public administrations being infected with a spirit of faction.
When I refer to factions, I mean a group of citizens, whether they make up a majority or a minority of the people, who are joined together and driven by some shared feeling of fervor, or special interest that is opposed to the rights of the rest of the people, or counter to the permanent good of the community as a whole.
There are two ways of eliminating the damage of factions: either by removing the cause, or by controlling the effects of it.
Likewise, there are two ways of removing the causes of factions: either by dismantling the liberty that allows them to exist, or by giving every other citizen the same opinions, the same fervor, and the same special interest.
Unfortunately, the first remedy -- dismantling liberty -- is worse than the disease. Liberty feeds factions like air feeds fire; without liberty, the faction would die. But destroying liberty and snuffing out political life because it nourishes factions would be like destroying air and killing animal life to avoid the risk of fire.
If the first option is unwise, the second option is unrealistic. As long as man's reason is imperfect, and he's free to use it, there will be differences of opinion. As long as man's reason is connected with his own self-interest, his opinions and feelings will always influence each other, and his feelings will always be attached to his opinions. The difference in men's capabilities, which is the basis of property rights [property is acquired by a man's own efforts, and he has a right to have and keep them] is an even more difficult barrier to everyone having the same interests and concerns. Protecting these capabilities is the first priority of government. Protecting varied and unequal capabilities means that people will possess different amounts and types of property. These differences in property will influence the feelings and perspectives of their owners, and that will naturally result in society being divided into different interests and parties.
Thus, the dormant causes of faction are inherent in the nature of man. We see them everywhere affecting all kinds of activity, depending on the circumstances of society. Zeal for religion or government, allegiance to different leaders who ambitiously compete for power, loyalty to people whose affluence appeals to human inclinations -- all of these have divided mankind into different parties, embittered them with mutual hostility towards each other, and made them more inclined to agitate and oppress each other instead of co-operating for their common benefit. This tendency for mankind to polarize into mutual animosity, even when there's no serious situation to divide over, is so strong that even the most frivolous and silly differences have been enough to kindle their combative emotions and inspire their most violent conflicts. The most common and lasting source of factions has always been the unequal distribution of property. Those who have property and those who don't have always formed divergent interests in society. Creditors and debtors fall into similar distinctions. Real estate interests, manufacturing interests, trade interests, banking interests, and many lesser interests grow up in civilized nations as a matter of course, and divide the people into different classes driven by their different sentiments and perspectives. The main job of modern legislation is to manage these various and interfering interests, and that means that a spirit of political parties and factions will be involved in the routine operations of government.
No person is ever allowed to be his own judge in a court case; his own self-interest would bias his judgment and probably corrupt his integrity. In the same way, a group of men are unfit to be judges and parties in the same legal court case at the same time. So why are so many of the most important acts of legislation made up of judicial decisions that don't protect the rights of individuals, but of large groups of citizens? And all the different legislators are pleading the very cases they're judging! If there's a law proposed that concerns private debts, the creditors are on one side, and the debtors are on the other side. Justice ought to be holding the balance of fairness between them. But instead, the parties are doing the judging themselves, and most powerful party in the case -- the most powerful faction -- generally wins. Should our domestic manufacturing be encouraged by placing restrictions on foreign manufacturers? If the faction of manufacturers gets to decide, there will be a much different outcome than if the real estate faction gets to decide -- and neither would be looking out for what's best and most fair for the public. Setting taxes on various types of property is an action that requires precise impartiality, yet it's the legislative act that offers the most temptation and opportunity for the strongest party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling they can charge the weaker party is a shilling they save from their own bank accounts.
It's useless to say that more enlightened politicians will be able to manage these conflicting interests and make them all submit to the public good. We won't always have enlightened politicians controlling the government. And all of these conflicting interests can't be managed fairly without considering the indirect consequences and long-range effects, but that will rarely be taken into consideration when one party can gain an immediate benefit by disregarding the rights of someone else, or even neglecting what's best for the group as a whole.
Thus, we have to conclude that the causes of faction can't be removed. Therefore, the only option we're left with is finding a way to control the effects of faction.
If a faction doesn't have enough supporters to be the majority, the republican principle will help by enabling the majority to outvote their sinister views. The faction might clog the administration or even disturb society, but it will be unable to do its damage and hide behind the Constitution. On the other hand, when a faction is in the majority, pure democracy will enable that faction to sacrifice the public good and the rights of other citizens to its own interests. Our goal is to safeguard the public good and individual rights against the danger of this kind of faction while preserving the spirit and form of democracy. This is exactly what is needed to rescue this form of government [democracy] from the disgrace it has labored under for so long, and make it worthy of being recommended for mankind to admire and adopt.
How can we do this? Apparently there are only two ways. Either prevent the same fervor or interest from influencing the majority at the same time, or, if they already have the same fervor or interest, make them unable to unite and act out their schemes of oppression by their number and local situation. If the desire to carry out their schemes coincides with the opportunity to put them into action, then we all know that we can't rely on those people's moral or religious motives to control them. Those motives don't restrain the injustice and violence of individuals, and the more people are combined together, the weaker those motives are. In other words, when those motives are needed most to curb mob mentality is just the time when they're the least effective.
Looking at it from this perspective, we can conclude that a pure democracy -- and by this, I mean a smallish society made up of not too many citizens where the entire community meets and manages the government -- can't cure the damage done by faction. In almost every case, a majority of the group will end up having the same passion or special interest. Because of the way that government is formed, they will be able to communicate with each other and act in harmony -- and there is nothing to restrain the temptation for them to sacrifice the weaker party or even an annoying individual. That's why those kinds of democracies are always scenes of disorder and conflict. They are incompatible with individual security or property rights. In general, those kinds of democracies are short lived and end violently. Theoretic politicians who have supported this kind of government have mistakenly assumed that, if we make everyone perfectly equal in their political rights, then everyone would be perfectly equal and the same in their possessions, their passions, and their passions.
A Republic -- meaning a government that has a system for representation -- is a different story. In fact, it promises the cure we're looking for. Let's consider the ways a Republic is different from a pure democracy, and then we'll understand the nature of the cure, and see how much more effectively the cure will work with a Union [rather than individual states].
The two biggest differences between a pure democracy and a representative Republic are, first of all, a Republic delegates the work of governing to a small number of citizens who are elected by everyone else, and, second, a Republic extends over a greater number of citizens and a larger sphere of the country.
The FIRST difference -- delegating government to a small number of citizens -- helps to refine and expand public opinions by filtering them through a group of chosen delegates whose wisdom should be able to discern what's best in the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love for justice will make them less likely to sacrifice what's best for short-sighted or side considerations. Under such circumstances, it could be that the public voice will be filtered through the representatives of the people, and will thus be more aligned to the public good than if the people themselves met to discuss the same issue. Then again, the result might be reversed. If divisive men who have local biases or sinister plans are able to get voted into office by fraud, corruption, or some other means, they might betray the interests of the people. So the question we're left with is -- whether small Republics [individual states] or large Republics [like the union] are more likely to get politicians elected who will guard the public good. It seems like a larger one is better for two reasons:
First, no matter how small a Republic might be, a certain number of representatives is needed to guard against a very few of them forming a cabal [plotting a conspiracy], and no matter how large a Republic might be, the number of representatives has to be limited to a certain number because too large a group would just cause confusion. Therefore, the number of representatives might not be in proportion to their constituents. But they will be proportionally greater in a smaller Republic [more representatives, less voters]. If we imagine a case where both the small and large Republic have the same number ratio of representatives [one representative per the same number of people], then the larger Republic will have more options [representatives], which will give a better chance of choosing someone competent.
And, second, since each representative will be voted on by more citizens in a larger Republic than a smaller one, it will be harder for unworthy candidates to win elections with corrupt tricks, which happens far too often. And, since the votes of the people are more free, it's more likely that the candidates with the most deserving merit and consistently proven characters will win.
In this, just like in most other cases, there is a middle ground, and inconveniences lie on both sides of that middle ground. If there's too large a ratio of voters, their representatives will be unable to become familiar with the local issues and limited interests of their constituents. But if a representative has too few constituents, he will be too devoted to them to truly appreciate and consider larger national issues. Our new federal Constitution creates a happy medium. The major collective interests fall under Federal jurisdiction, while local issues specific to small groups of people fall under State jurisdiction.
The SECOND difference is how many more citizens and how much larger a span of territory can be governed with a representative Republic than with a pure democracy. This [more people, larger territory] is why factious combinations will be less fearful in a representative Republic than in a pure democracy. The smaller a society is, the fewer parties and special interests are likely to be included in its makeup. The fewer parties and special interests there are, the more frequently they'll be able to collect a majority of people who agree on a special interest [the fewer people it will take to give any single faction a majority]. The smaller the group that makes up a majority, and the smaller the area they influence, the more easily they'll be able to work together and put their plans of oppression into practice. If you widen their sphere, it will include a greater variety of parties and special interests, and that means that it will be harder to get up a majority who will have the same motive in common and be united to infringe on the rights of other citizens. If enough people do share a motive in common, it will be harder for all of those who feel it to be aware of how many strong they are, so they won't be as easily able to come together and act in unison. There are other obstacles, but whenever people have a sense that their motive is unjust or dishonorable, their tendency to reach out and connect with other like-minded people is hindered by their own distrust, and the more people are required to act, the more suspicious each individual will be about reaching out.
Therefore, it seems clear that the advantage a Republic has over a pure democracy in being better able to control the results of faction works better with a large Republic than a smaller one, and it works better for a Union than for the individual states that make up that Union. Is that because the representatives of a Republic have enlightened views and virtuous sentiments that make them able to rise above local bias and unjust schemes? Yes. As a matter of fact, the representatives of the Union probably will possess those necessary qualities. Does the ability to control factions come from the added security that more parties provides, so that one party isn't able to outnumber and then oppress the others? Yes, the increased number of parties within the Union does add to the security. And finally, do greater obstacles that prevent an unjust majority with special interests from banding together to accomplish their secret goals help to control factions? Yes. Here again, the larger size of a Union gives it a clear advantage over separate, smaller states.
The influence of divisive leaders might inspire passion within their specific states, but those leaders won't be as able to spread their partisan strife throughout the other states. A religious group might deteriorate into a political faction in a region within the Union, but the sheer number of other religious groups spread out over the entire Union will protect the legislature from any danger that might come from that religious group. A mania for paper money, or an obsession for abolishing debts, or for equal distribution of property, or any other imprudent or immoral project will be less able to infect the entire Union even if it affects a group of individuals in it. On a smaller scale, this kind of faction might affect a city or county without spreading to an entire state.
We think the size and suitable structure of the Union will provide a Republican remedy for the diseases that are most likely to be connected with a Republican government. The amount of pride and pleasure we take in being Republican should be reflected in our eagerness to defend the spirit and support the character of Federalists [those who want to ratify the Constitution].
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
by James Madison, November 23, 1787.
To: the people of New York,
Of all the many advantages that a well-designed Union provides, the one that should be most accurately pointed out is its tendency to break up and manage the violence of factions [pressure groups with their own agenda]. Anyone who welcomes popular governments [pure democracy] dreads the future of such governments when he reflects on their tendency to fall into this dangerous evil. Because of his dread, he will appreciate a plan that respects the principles of democracy while also providing a cure for factions. Popular governments [pure democracies] have perished everywhere because of the fatal diseases of instability, injustice, and confusion that were introduced into public discussion. Yet popular governments continue to be the most popular and most productive topics that the enemies of liberty use in their misleading speeches. The earlier American constitutions [Mayflower Compact, Articles of Confederation, state constitutions] made some valuable improvements on democratic governments, but they are still faulty. Only the most biased person would say that those constitutions averted the danger of violent factions as much as they hoped and expected. Our most respectful and virtuous citizens, as well as Christians, churches, and people who value public freedom and personal liberty are all complaining that our governments are too unstable. They protest that while opposing parties fight, the public good is neglected, and legislation is all too often decided by the stronger force of an overbearing majority with an agenda instead of according to the standards of justice and the rights of the smaller group. We might wish that these complaints had no basis, but we can't deny that they have a point when we see the evidence of obvious facts. When we consider the situation honestly, we will find that some of our distresses are not the government's fault. At the same time, other causes by themselves can't account for many of our most severe afflictions, especially not the increasing and overruling distrust of public meetings and the concern about individual rights that people are denouncing all over the continent. These must be mostly, if not totally, the effects of the instability and injustice caused by our public administrations being infected with a spirit of faction.
When I refer to factions, I mean a group of citizens, whether they make up a majority or a minority of the people, who are joined together and driven by some shared feeling of fervor, or special interest that is opposed to the rights of the rest of the people, or counter to the permanent good of the community as a whole.
There are two ways of eliminating the damage of factions: either by removing the cause, or by controlling the effects of it.
Likewise, there are two ways of removing the causes of factions: either by dismantling the liberty that allows them to exist, or by giving every other citizen the same opinions, the same fervor, and the same special interest.
Unfortunately, the first remedy -- dismantling liberty -- is worse than the disease. Liberty feeds factions like air feeds fire; without liberty, the faction would die. But destroying liberty and snuffing out political life because it nourishes factions would be like destroying air and killing animal life to avoid the risk of fire.
If the first option is unwise, the second option is unrealistic. As long as man's reason is imperfect, and he's free to use it, there will be differences of opinion. As long as man's reason is connected with his own self-interest, his opinions and feelings will always influence each other, and his feelings will always be attached to his opinions. The difference in men's capabilities, which is the basis of property rights [property is acquired by a man's own efforts, and he has a right to have and keep them] is an even more difficult barrier to everyone having the same interests and concerns. Protecting these capabilities is the first priority of government. Protecting varied and unequal capabilities means that people will possess different amounts and types of property. These differences in property will influence the feelings and perspectives of their owners, and that will naturally result in society being divided into different interests and parties.
Thus, the dormant causes of faction are inherent in the nature of man. We see them everywhere affecting all kinds of activity, depending on the circumstances of society. Zeal for religion or government, allegiance to different leaders who ambitiously compete for power, loyalty to people whose affluence appeals to human inclinations -- all of these have divided mankind into different parties, embittered them with mutual hostility towards each other, and made them more inclined to agitate and oppress each other instead of co-operating for their common benefit. This tendency for mankind to polarize into mutual animosity, even when there's no serious situation to divide over, is so strong that even the most frivolous and silly differences have been enough to kindle their combative emotions and inspire their most violent conflicts. The most common and lasting source of factions has always been the unequal distribution of property. Those who have property and those who don't have always formed divergent interests in society. Creditors and debtors fall into similar distinctions. Real estate interests, manufacturing interests, trade interests, banking interests, and many lesser interests grow up in civilized nations as a matter of course, and divide the people into different classes driven by their different sentiments and perspectives. The main job of modern legislation is to manage these various and interfering interests, and that means that a spirit of political parties and factions will be involved in the routine operations of government.
No person is ever allowed to be his own judge in a court case; his own self-interest would bias his judgment and probably corrupt his integrity. In the same way, a group of men are unfit to be judges and parties in the same legal court case at the same time. So why are so many of the most important acts of legislation made up of judicial decisions that don't protect the rights of individuals, but of large groups of citizens? And all the different legislators are pleading the very cases they're judging! If there's a law proposed that concerns private debts, the creditors are on one side, and the debtors are on the other side. Justice ought to be holding the balance of fairness between them. But instead, the parties are doing the judging themselves, and most powerful party in the case -- the most powerful faction -- generally wins. Should our domestic manufacturing be encouraged by placing restrictions on foreign manufacturers? If the faction of manufacturers gets to decide, there will be a much different outcome than if the real estate faction gets to decide -- and neither would be looking out for what's best and most fair for the public. Setting taxes on various types of property is an action that requires precise impartiality, yet it's the legislative act that offers the most temptation and opportunity for the strongest party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling they can charge the weaker party is a shilling they save from their own bank accounts.
It's useless to say that more enlightened politicians will be able to manage these conflicting interests and make them all submit to the public good. We won't always have enlightened politicians controlling the government. And all of these conflicting interests can't be managed fairly without considering the indirect consequences and long-range effects, but that will rarely be taken into consideration when one party can gain an immediate benefit by disregarding the rights of someone else, or even neglecting what's best for the group as a whole.
Thus, we have to conclude that the causes of faction can't be removed. Therefore, the only option we're left with is finding a way to control the effects of faction.
If a faction doesn't have enough supporters to be the majority, the republican principle will help by enabling the majority to outvote their sinister views. The faction might clog the administration or even disturb society, but it will be unable to do its damage and hide behind the Constitution. On the other hand, when a faction is in the majority, pure democracy will enable that faction to sacrifice the public good and the rights of other citizens to its own interests. Our goal is to safeguard the public good and individual rights against the danger of this kind of faction while preserving the spirit and form of democracy. This is exactly what is needed to rescue this form of government [democracy] from the disgrace it has labored under for so long, and make it worthy of being recommended for mankind to admire and adopt.
How can we do this? Apparently there are only two ways. Either prevent the same fervor or interest from influencing the majority at the same time, or, if they already have the same fervor or interest, make them unable to unite and act out their schemes of oppression by their number and local situation. If the desire to carry out their schemes coincides with the opportunity to put them into action, then we all know that we can't rely on those people's moral or religious motives to control them. Those motives don't restrain the injustice and violence of individuals, and the more people are combined together, the weaker those motives are. In other words, when those motives are needed most to curb mob mentality is just the time when they're the least effective.
Looking at it from this perspective, we can conclude that a pure democracy -- and by this, I mean a smallish society made up of not too many citizens where the entire community meets and manages the government -- can't cure the damage done by faction. In almost every case, a majority of the group will end up having the same passion or special interest. Because of the way that government is formed, they will be able to communicate with each other and act in harmony -- and there is nothing to restrain the temptation for them to sacrifice the weaker party or even an annoying individual. That's why those kinds of democracies are always scenes of disorder and conflict. They are incompatible with individual security or property rights. In general, those kinds of democracies are short lived and end violently. Theoretic politicians who have supported this kind of government have mistakenly assumed that, if we make everyone perfectly equal in their political rights, then everyone would be perfectly equal and the same in their possessions, their passions, and their passions.
A Republic -- meaning a government that has a system for representation -- is a different story. In fact, it promises the cure we're looking for. Let's consider the ways a Republic is different from a pure democracy, and then we'll understand the nature of the cure, and see how much more effectively the cure will work with a Union [rather than individual states].
The two biggest differences between a pure democracy and a representative Republic are, first of all, a Republic delegates the work of governing to a small number of citizens who are elected by everyone else, and, second, a Republic extends over a greater number of citizens and a larger sphere of the country.
The FIRST difference -- delegating government to a small number of citizens -- helps to refine and expand public opinions by filtering them through a group of chosen delegates whose wisdom should be able to discern what's best in the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love for justice will make them less likely to sacrifice what's best for short-sighted or side considerations. Under such circumstances, it could be that the public voice will be filtered through the representatives of the people, and will thus be more aligned to the public good than if the people themselves met to discuss the same issue. Then again, the result might be reversed. If divisive men who have local biases or sinister plans are able to get voted into office by fraud, corruption, or some other means, they might betray the interests of the people. So the question we're left with is -- whether small Republics [individual states] or large Republics [like the union] are more likely to get politicians elected who will guard the public good. It seems like a larger one is better for two reasons:
First, no matter how small a Republic might be, a certain number of representatives is needed to guard against a very few of them forming a cabal [plotting a conspiracy], and no matter how large a Republic might be, the number of representatives has to be limited to a certain number because too large a group would just cause confusion. Therefore, the number of representatives might not be in proportion to their constituents. But they will be proportionally greater in a smaller Republic [more representatives, less voters]. If we imagine a case where both the small and large Republic have the same number ratio of representatives [one representative per the same number of people], then the larger Republic will have more options [representatives], which will give a better chance of choosing someone competent.
And, second, since each representative will be voted on by more citizens in a larger Republic than a smaller one, it will be harder for unworthy candidates to win elections with corrupt tricks, which happens far too often. And, since the votes of the people are more free, it's more likely that the candidates with the most deserving merit and consistently proven characters will win.
In this, just like in most other cases, there is a middle ground, and inconveniences lie on both sides of that middle ground. If there's too large a ratio of voters, their representatives will be unable to become familiar with the local issues and limited interests of their constituents. But if a representative has too few constituents, he will be too devoted to them to truly appreciate and consider larger national issues. Our new federal Constitution creates a happy medium. The major collective interests fall under Federal jurisdiction, while local issues specific to small groups of people fall under State jurisdiction.
The SECOND difference is how many more citizens and how much larger a span of territory can be governed with a representative Republic than with a pure democracy. This [more people, larger territory] is why factious combinations will be less fearful in a representative Republic than in a pure democracy. The smaller a society is, the fewer parties and special interests are likely to be included in its makeup. The fewer parties and special interests there are, the more frequently they'll be able to collect a majority of people who agree on a special interest [the fewer people it will take to give any single faction a majority]. The smaller the group that makes up a majority, and the smaller the area they influence, the more easily they'll be able to work together and put their plans of oppression into practice. If you widen their sphere, it will include a greater variety of parties and special interests, and that means that it will be harder to get up a majority who will have the same motive in common and be united to infringe on the rights of other citizens. If enough people do share a motive in common, it will be harder for all of those who feel it to be aware of how many strong they are, so they won't be as easily able to come together and act in unison. There are other obstacles, but whenever people have a sense that their motive is unjust or dishonorable, their tendency to reach out and connect with other like-minded people is hindered by their own distrust, and the more people are required to act, the more suspicious each individual will be about reaching out.
Therefore, it seems clear that the advantage a Republic has over a pure democracy in being better able to control the results of faction works better with a large Republic than a smaller one, and it works better for a Union than for the individual states that make up that Union. Is that because the representatives of a Republic have enlightened views and virtuous sentiments that make them able to rise above local bias and unjust schemes? Yes. As a matter of fact, the representatives of the Union probably will possess those necessary qualities. Does the ability to control factions come from the added security that more parties provides, so that one party isn't able to outnumber and then oppress the others? Yes, the increased number of parties within the Union does add to the security. And finally, do greater obstacles that prevent an unjust majority with special interests from banding together to accomplish their secret goals help to control factions? Yes. Here again, the larger size of a Union gives it a clear advantage over separate, smaller states.
The influence of divisive leaders might inspire passion within their specific states, but those leaders won't be as able to spread their partisan strife throughout the other states. A religious group might deteriorate into a political faction in a region within the Union, but the sheer number of other religious groups spread out over the entire Union will protect the legislature from any danger that might come from that religious group. A mania for paper money, or an obsession for abolishing debts, or for equal distribution of property, or any other imprudent or immoral project will be less able to infect the entire Union even if it affects a group of individuals in it. On a smaller scale, this kind of faction might affect a city or county without spreading to an entire state.
We think the size and suitable structure of the Union will provide a Republican remedy for the diseases that are most likely to be connected with a Republican government. The amount of pride and pleasure we take in being Republican should be reflected in our eagerness to defend the spirit and support the character of Federalists [those who want to ratify the Constitution].
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
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