Federalist 51 Paraphrased
The Federalist Number 51: The Structure of the Government Must Supply the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Branches of Government, paraphrased into Modern English
by James Madison, February 6, 1788.
To: the people of New York,
What method should we resort to in order to maintain the necessary division of power among the different branches of government as specified in the Constitution? There's only one answer. Since we have found all of these exterior provisions [the voters themselves] to be inadequate, then the interior government must be carefully planned so that its different parts, by their mutual relationships, can be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. I won't attempt to fully explain this important concept, but I will make a few observations. Maybe my comments will place it in a clearer light and help us to form a more accurate assessment of the structure and principles of the government that was set up by the convention when they wrote up the Constitution.
In order to lay a proper foundation for the separate and distinct functions of the different powers of government -- which, to a certain extent, everyone admits is essential to preserve liberty -- it is obvious that each branch should have a will of its own [political will: a mission to promote a particular policy]. Therefore, the government should be set up so that the members of each branch should have as little influence as possible in appointing members of the other branches. If this principle was followed strictly, then it would require all of the appointments for the president, legislature, and judicial magistrates to be drawn from the same source of authority -- the people -- using methods that are free from the influence of the other branches. Perhaps this plan of creating different branches won't be as difficult in practice as it sounds. But doing it that strictly would cause a lot of inconvenience and cost more money. Therefore, some adjustments from the original concept have been necessary. Specifically in the judicial branch, it might be unwise to insist on adhering to the exact principle. For one thing, since specific qualifications are required for the judges, the first priority should be using a method that ensures that the judges who are chosen will have the necessary qualifications [judges shouldn't be selected by popular vote]. And, second, the permanent nature of their positions will quickly weaken any sense of dependence they might have on the people who select them for the position [they won't have to worry about appeasing voters or legislators].
It is also obvious that members of each branch should be as free as possible from dependence on the members of the other branches for their pay. If the president or the judges were dependent on the legislators for their salary, their independence in every other regard would be no more than a formality -- a pretense.
But the steadfast guarantee that the different branches won't gradually become concentrated in the same branch consists in this: those who direct each branch will have the necessary Constitutional means as well as the personal motives to resist the temptation of encroaching on members of the other branches. As in all other cases, the defensive plan should be in proportion to the risk: take advantage of a man's natural ambition in order to counteract ambition. The individual member's interest must be connected with the Constitutional rights of his own position. Perhaps it's a negative reflection of human nature that these kinds of means have to be used to control the abuses of government. But the need for government itself is, after all, the greatest reflection on human nature. If men were perfect angels, there would be no need for government. If angels were put in a position to govern men, there would be no need for external or internal controls on government. In creating a government that uses mere men to manage men, the great challenge is this: the government must have the authority to control the people it governs, but, at the same time, the government has to be compelled to control itself. Undoubtedly, having to depend on the people [who vote] is the greatest control on the government, but experience has shown that some additional precautions are also necessary.
The practice of using opposite and competing interests to motivate governing officials to control themselves can be traced through the history of mankind, both private and public. We frequently see it in action with lesser offices, where the constant goal is to divide and arrange the various positions in such a way that they all provide a restraint for each other. In this way, each individual's private interest acts as a guard over the rights of the people. These wise strategies are not just effective for lesser offices; they're just as important for managing the highest powers of our own government.
But it's not possible to give each branch the same amount of self-defense. In a representative Republican government, the legislative power will need to have more power. But there's a solution for this inconvenience: divide the legislature itself into different branches! Give each branch a different method for being elected into office, and different principles of action that are as disconnected from each other as their common duties and common dependence on society will allow. It might be necessary to build in still further precautions to guard against perilous encroachments. Since the legislative branch's significant power requires it to be divided like this, the comparative weakness of the executive branch might seem like it needs an extra boost in power. An unchecked ability to negate the legislature [by veto] might seem to be a logical defense for the president. But that might not be totally safe. It might not even be sufficient by itself. On ordinary occasions, it might not be exercised firmly enough, and on unusual occasions, it might be treacherously abused. But what if this absolute authority to negate [veto] the legislature could also have some kind of limited connection between this weaker executive branch [the president], and the weaker of the two legislative branches [the Senate] in such a way that the legislative branch could be encouraged to support the president's Constitutional rights without conceding its own legislative rights?
I think these observations are based on fair and just principles. But if they're tested by applying them to several state constitutions, as well as applying them to the federal Constitution, then if they don't work well with with federal government, they'll be even less likely to work with a state government.
Additionally. there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to the federal government of America and which place the country in a very interesting perspective.
FIRST, in a single [united] Republic, all of the power the people relinquish is given to a single government. The people are protected from the government seizing too much of their liberty by dividing the government into distinct and separate branches. But America is a compound Republic; any power the people relinquish is first divided between two different governments [state and federal], and then each of those governments has to subdivide that power into distinct and separate branches [within the state and federal governments]. All of those different governments will keep each other in check, while controlling themselves at the same time.
SECOND, it's not only important to guard the society from the oppression of its leaders, but it's vitally imperative in a Republic to protect one group in society from the injustice of another group. It's inevitable that different classes of people will have different interests. If the majority are united by some special interest they have in common, the rights of the minority could be in jeopardy. There are only two ways of preventing this evil: by creating a common will [related to Rousseau's concept of a "general will" -- when a society deliberately determines (or is told) what is best for the society] among the entire society that's independent of the majority, or by having a society made up of so many different kinds of citizens that there's not much likelihood of an unjust majority joining together to promote the same cause -- and in such a society, forming a majority would be impractical. The first method -- creating a common will [being told what's best for all] -- works in governments where leadership is inherited or self-appointed. But this is an unstable safeguard at best. A power that's independent of the society might promote the rightful interests of the minority -- but it's just as likely to promote the same unjust cause as the majority. In fact, it may turn against both the minority and the majority. The second method -- having a society made up different kinds of citizens -- is exactly what the federal Republic of the United States will be [if the Constitution is ratified]. Its authority will be derived from the society and dependent on the society, but the society itself will be made up of different parts, varied interests, and diverse classes of people. There won't be much danger of groups forming a majority based on special interests and threatening the rights of individuals or minority groups. In a free country, the guaranteed protection for civil rights must be the same as the guaranteed protection for religious rights. Civil groups are made up of multiple interests, and religious groups are made up of multiple sects and denominations. The amount of guaranteed protection in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects, and that will probably depend on the size of the region and the population that are included under the same government. Looking at it this way, all sincere and prudent supporters of Republican government should approve of a properly run federal system. It's clear that the more the Union is divided into separate confederacies or states, the easier it will be for oppressive majorities to form. If that happens, the surest guarantee of protection for the rights of every class of citizens that a Republican government can offer will be diminished, which means that the only other guarantee of protection -- the stability and independence of one of the branches of government -- will have to be increased to deal with it. [And that would be a bad thing.]
The government's purpose is to maintain justice. Civil society's purpose is to maintain justice. Justice has always been aimed for, and justice will continue to be pursued either until it is obtained, or until liberty is lost in the pursuit of it. In any society with a government that allows the stronger faction to unite and oppress the weaker faction, it might as well be the kind of anarchy that reigns in nature, where the weaker animal has no protection from being attacked by a stronger animal. In a society like that, even stronger individuals will feel vulnerable and want to submit to a government that might protect the weak as well as themselves. In the same way, the stronger factions will gradually feel vulnerable and wish for a government that will protect the weaker as well as the stronger factions.
Imagine if the tiny state of Rhode Island was separated from the Union and left isolated to fend for itself. Imagine the vulnerability of rights under a pure democracy within such a narrow population. Divisive majorities would inflict repeated oppressions until the resulting disorder induced them to call for the help of some power totally independent of the people to deal with the mess they created. But the Republic of the United States covers such an extended area geographically, and includes so many varied interests, parts, and religious sects, that an alliance of a majority from the whole society could hardly form around any single issue, except maybe on justice and the general good of the people. Thus, the minority experiences less risk from the will of the majority. That means there's less need to protect the minority by introducing a will into the government that's not dependent on the majority -- in other words, a will that's independent of the society itself [a dictated will that's imposed on the people]. In spite of the opposing opinions that have been expressed against the federal Constitution, it is as certain as it is important that the larger the society, provided it lies within a practical area, the more capable it will be of self-government. Fortunately for the Republic, the practical area can be extended to a great expanse by modifying and incorporating the federal principle [one centralized government, along with smaller state governments].
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
by James Madison, February 6, 1788.
To: the people of New York,
What method should we resort to in order to maintain the necessary division of power among the different branches of government as specified in the Constitution? There's only one answer. Since we have found all of these exterior provisions [the voters themselves] to be inadequate, then the interior government must be carefully planned so that its different parts, by their mutual relationships, can be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. I won't attempt to fully explain this important concept, but I will make a few observations. Maybe my comments will place it in a clearer light and help us to form a more accurate assessment of the structure and principles of the government that was set up by the convention when they wrote up the Constitution.
In order to lay a proper foundation for the separate and distinct functions of the different powers of government -- which, to a certain extent, everyone admits is essential to preserve liberty -- it is obvious that each branch should have a will of its own [political will: a mission to promote a particular policy]. Therefore, the government should be set up so that the members of each branch should have as little influence as possible in appointing members of the other branches. If this principle was followed strictly, then it would require all of the appointments for the president, legislature, and judicial magistrates to be drawn from the same source of authority -- the people -- using methods that are free from the influence of the other branches. Perhaps this plan of creating different branches won't be as difficult in practice as it sounds. But doing it that strictly would cause a lot of inconvenience and cost more money. Therefore, some adjustments from the original concept have been necessary. Specifically in the judicial branch, it might be unwise to insist on adhering to the exact principle. For one thing, since specific qualifications are required for the judges, the first priority should be using a method that ensures that the judges who are chosen will have the necessary qualifications [judges shouldn't be selected by popular vote]. And, second, the permanent nature of their positions will quickly weaken any sense of dependence they might have on the people who select them for the position [they won't have to worry about appeasing voters or legislators].
It is also obvious that members of each branch should be as free as possible from dependence on the members of the other branches for their pay. If the president or the judges were dependent on the legislators for their salary, their independence in every other regard would be no more than a formality -- a pretense.
But the steadfast guarantee that the different branches won't gradually become concentrated in the same branch consists in this: those who direct each branch will have the necessary Constitutional means as well as the personal motives to resist the temptation of encroaching on members of the other branches. As in all other cases, the defensive plan should be in proportion to the risk: take advantage of a man's natural ambition in order to counteract ambition. The individual member's interest must be connected with the Constitutional rights of his own position. Perhaps it's a negative reflection of human nature that these kinds of means have to be used to control the abuses of government. But the need for government itself is, after all, the greatest reflection on human nature. If men were perfect angels, there would be no need for government. If angels were put in a position to govern men, there would be no need for external or internal controls on government. In creating a government that uses mere men to manage men, the great challenge is this: the government must have the authority to control the people it governs, but, at the same time, the government has to be compelled to control itself. Undoubtedly, having to depend on the people [who vote] is the greatest control on the government, but experience has shown that some additional precautions are also necessary.
The practice of using opposite and competing interests to motivate governing officials to control themselves can be traced through the history of mankind, both private and public. We frequently see it in action with lesser offices, where the constant goal is to divide and arrange the various positions in such a way that they all provide a restraint for each other. In this way, each individual's private interest acts as a guard over the rights of the people. These wise strategies are not just effective for lesser offices; they're just as important for managing the highest powers of our own government.
But it's not possible to give each branch the same amount of self-defense. In a representative Republican government, the legislative power will need to have more power. But there's a solution for this inconvenience: divide the legislature itself into different branches! Give each branch a different method for being elected into office, and different principles of action that are as disconnected from each other as their common duties and common dependence on society will allow. It might be necessary to build in still further precautions to guard against perilous encroachments. Since the legislative branch's significant power requires it to be divided like this, the comparative weakness of the executive branch might seem like it needs an extra boost in power. An unchecked ability to negate the legislature [by veto] might seem to be a logical defense for the president. But that might not be totally safe. It might not even be sufficient by itself. On ordinary occasions, it might not be exercised firmly enough, and on unusual occasions, it might be treacherously abused. But what if this absolute authority to negate [veto] the legislature could also have some kind of limited connection between this weaker executive branch [the president], and the weaker of the two legislative branches [the Senate] in such a way that the legislative branch could be encouraged to support the president's Constitutional rights without conceding its own legislative rights?
I think these observations are based on fair and just principles. But if they're tested by applying them to several state constitutions, as well as applying them to the federal Constitution, then if they don't work well with with federal government, they'll be even less likely to work with a state government.
Additionally. there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to the federal government of America and which place the country in a very interesting perspective.
FIRST, in a single [united] Republic, all of the power the people relinquish is given to a single government. The people are protected from the government seizing too much of their liberty by dividing the government into distinct and separate branches. But America is a compound Republic; any power the people relinquish is first divided between two different governments [state and federal], and then each of those governments has to subdivide that power into distinct and separate branches [within the state and federal governments]. All of those different governments will keep each other in check, while controlling themselves at the same time.
SECOND, it's not only important to guard the society from the oppression of its leaders, but it's vitally imperative in a Republic to protect one group in society from the injustice of another group. It's inevitable that different classes of people will have different interests. If the majority are united by some special interest they have in common, the rights of the minority could be in jeopardy. There are only two ways of preventing this evil: by creating a common will [related to Rousseau's concept of a "general will" -- when a society deliberately determines (or is told) what is best for the society] among the entire society that's independent of the majority, or by having a society made up of so many different kinds of citizens that there's not much likelihood of an unjust majority joining together to promote the same cause -- and in such a society, forming a majority would be impractical. The first method -- creating a common will [being told what's best for all] -- works in governments where leadership is inherited or self-appointed. But this is an unstable safeguard at best. A power that's independent of the society might promote the rightful interests of the minority -- but it's just as likely to promote the same unjust cause as the majority. In fact, it may turn against both the minority and the majority. The second method -- having a society made up different kinds of citizens -- is exactly what the federal Republic of the United States will be [if the Constitution is ratified]. Its authority will be derived from the society and dependent on the society, but the society itself will be made up of different parts, varied interests, and diverse classes of people. There won't be much danger of groups forming a majority based on special interests and threatening the rights of individuals or minority groups. In a free country, the guaranteed protection for civil rights must be the same as the guaranteed protection for religious rights. Civil groups are made up of multiple interests, and religious groups are made up of multiple sects and denominations. The amount of guaranteed protection in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects, and that will probably depend on the size of the region and the population that are included under the same government. Looking at it this way, all sincere and prudent supporters of Republican government should approve of a properly run federal system. It's clear that the more the Union is divided into separate confederacies or states, the easier it will be for oppressive majorities to form. If that happens, the surest guarantee of protection for the rights of every class of citizens that a Republican government can offer will be diminished, which means that the only other guarantee of protection -- the stability and independence of one of the branches of government -- will have to be increased to deal with it. [And that would be a bad thing.]
The government's purpose is to maintain justice. Civil society's purpose is to maintain justice. Justice has always been aimed for, and justice will continue to be pursued either until it is obtained, or until liberty is lost in the pursuit of it. In any society with a government that allows the stronger faction to unite and oppress the weaker faction, it might as well be the kind of anarchy that reigns in nature, where the weaker animal has no protection from being attacked by a stronger animal. In a society like that, even stronger individuals will feel vulnerable and want to submit to a government that might protect the weak as well as themselves. In the same way, the stronger factions will gradually feel vulnerable and wish for a government that will protect the weaker as well as the stronger factions.
Imagine if the tiny state of Rhode Island was separated from the Union and left isolated to fend for itself. Imagine the vulnerability of rights under a pure democracy within such a narrow population. Divisive majorities would inflict repeated oppressions until the resulting disorder induced them to call for the help of some power totally independent of the people to deal with the mess they created. But the Republic of the United States covers such an extended area geographically, and includes so many varied interests, parts, and religious sects, that an alliance of a majority from the whole society could hardly form around any single issue, except maybe on justice and the general good of the people. Thus, the minority experiences less risk from the will of the majority. That means there's less need to protect the minority by introducing a will into the government that's not dependent on the majority -- in other words, a will that's independent of the society itself [a dictated will that's imposed on the people]. In spite of the opposing opinions that have been expressed against the federal Constitution, it is as certain as it is important that the larger the society, provided it lies within a practical area, the more capable it will be of self-government. Fortunately for the Republic, the practical area can be extended to a great expanse by modifying and incorporating the federal principle [one centralized government, along with smaller state governments].
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
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