Federalist 70 Paraphrased
The Federalist Number 70: The Executive Branch Further Considered paraphrased into Modern English
by Alexander Hamilton, May 28, 1788.
To: the people of New York,
Some people say that a strong executive branch [president] conflicts with the genius of republican government. Those enlightened friends of republican government must be hoping that their criticism has no basis because it's impossible for them to acknowledge its truth without condemning their own principles. A powerful executive is an important component in a good government. It is essential in order to protect the country against foreign attacks, to consistently carry out the laws, to protect property against improper and overbearing combinations that sometimes interfere with routine justice, to protect liberty against schemes and violations that might come from overly ambitious politicians, divisive factions, or even anarchy. Anyone who is even a little familiar with Roman history knows how often their republic had to be protected by taking refuge in the absolute power of a single man who was considered a Dictator. He protected the republic from the schemes of ambitious men who wanted to be tyrants, from entire classes of society who rebelled and threatened anarchy, or from the invasion of foreign enemies who threatened to conquer and destroy Rome.
We don't need to bring up more arguments or examples on this subject. A weak, feeble executive means the government will be carried out weakly and feebly. A government carried out weakly and feebly is just another way of saying the government is carried out badly, and a badly carried out government, no matter what kind of high-minded ideals it may rest on, is just a bad government in its actual practice.
If we assume that all sensible men will agree that a powerful executive is needed, the only thing left to ask is: what ingredients are necessary to make up this power? How much can those ingredients be combined with everything else that creates safety in the republican sense? And how close is this combination to what was written in the new Constitution?
These are the ingredients that make up power in the Executive branch: 1. unity; 2. duration; 3. enough provisions for its support; 4. competent authority.
These are the ingredients that make up safety in the republican sense: 1. the proper dependence on the people [votes]; 2. the proper accountability.
The most respected, reasonable, and fair-minded statesmen have supported government with a single executive [one person, not a team], and a legislature with many members. They have correctly considered that energetic drive is the most important requirement for the executive, and that this works best in a single person. And they have also correctly considered that the legislature is the most suited for thoughtful debate and wisdom, and best able to satisfy the the people's confidence and protect their privileges and interests.
Nobody will deny that unity promotes periods of activity. One single man [a unity of one] will be more able to make decisions, put plans into action, keep secrets, and communicate effectively than a group of people. In fact, the more people are involved, the more these activities will be hampered.
Unity can be neutralized in two ways -- either by spreading the authority equally between two or more leaders, or by giving it to one man and then making him submit to the control and co-operation of others who are supposed to counsel him. Two or more leaders is the situation Rome had with its Consuls. And some of the state constitutions provide models of a leader in subjection to counselors. Only New York and New Jersey give their governors full executive control. There are some who promote either of these ways of neutralizing the unity of a single leader, but the method of having executive counselors is the most popular. Both methods are prone to the same issues, so they can usually be considered together.
We don't have very many examples from other countries to demonstrate how a weakened executive branch works. But the few examples we do have show that two equal executives isn't a good idea. The Achaens [ancient Greece] tried having two praetors, but the problems it caused made them abolish one of the positions. Roman history records many situations where the republic was endangered because of conflict between their Consuls, or between their military Tribunes who sometimes took the place of Consuls. But we never see any times that Rome benefited from having more than one leader. We might wonder why conflict between leaders wasn't more common, or even more violent -- until we realize that, more often, they had a single leader, and when they did have two Consuls, they also had a prudent policy of dividing [rather than sharing] the government between them. The aristocratic patricians were perpetually struggling with the lower class plebeians to preserve their ancient authority and dignity. Consuls usually came from the patricians and were usually united by a common personal interest in defending the privilege of their class. Besides this motivation for working together, once the republic was larger due to conquering other nations, it became customary for Consuls to divide the administration by lot [much like drawing straws or flipping a coin] so that one of them would stay at home and govern the city of Rome, and the other would govern the more distant provinces. Separating them like this probably helped to prevent the bickerings and rivalries that might threaten the peace of the republic.
If we leave the dim light of historical research, and focus only on reason and common sense, we'll find even more cause to reject the idea of plurality in the executive branch, no matter which method is used to achieve that plurality.
Any time two or more people are engaged in the same project, there's always a risk of them having a difference of opinion. Whether it's a public trust [something that belongs to the public but is managed by a representative] or a public office where two or more officials have equal dignity and equal authority, there is a distinct danger of personal envy or even hostility, leading to bitter dissensions. When this happens, the authority of the position is weakened and the respectability of the office is diminished. The plans and projects of those they divide are distracted as those people take sides and become involved in bickering amongst themselves. When this happens with multiple leaders within the highest executive office of a country, it could cause important government actions to be frustrated or delayed during critical emergencies of the country. Even worse, they might split the community into violent and hostile factions, siding with one or the other of the leaders.
Sometimes people are against a thing simply because they didn't get to help plan it, or because it was planned by someone they didn't like. Or, if they were consulted and don't approve of the final concept, they become personally offended and feel bound by honor and by all their personal convictions of infallible rightness to defeat the success of the measure because of their personal disagreement. Decent, generous men have had too many opportunities to see, with horror, what lengths people with this disposition will go to, and how often the highest interests of society are sacrificed to the personal vanity, conceit, or stubbornness of individuals whose passions and impulses make them interesting personalities. It's possible that the question of whether or not to ratify the new Constitution will bring out examples of this disgraceful weakness -- or, rather, this hateful depravity -- in human nature.
In a free government, there will be inconveniences like this in the legislative branch [because the legislature is made up of many members], but it's not necessary to introduce that kind of potential for conflict in the executive branch, and it's also unwise. In fact, in the highest level of leadership, it's downright dangerous. In a legislature, being able to make hasty decisions is more of an evil than a benefit. The various opinions and clashing of parties in the legislative branch can sometimes obstruct beneficial plans, but they also encourage reflection, discussion, and caution. They also curb excesses in the majority. But once the vote has been taken and an issue is resolved, opposition ends. The bill that was so hotly debated becomes a law, and resisting it becomes a crime. [The conflict served a purpose, but is resolved peacefully.] But there are no benefits that can make up for conflict within the executive branch. Within the executive branch, conflict is pure and unmixed. There is no point where an issue is resolved and conflict ceases. Conflict only causes embarrassment and weakens the plan when it's carried out, all the way from the first step to the final conclusion. Bickering counteracts the qualities that are necessary to an efficient executive -- dynamic power and swift action. It hinders these without providing any benefit to make up for it. In time of war, when the strength of the President is the safeguard of national security, the disadvantages of having more than one man in charge would be a drawback.
Admittedly, these observations would be a bigger issue with two executives of equal rank, and not many will be supporting that particular arrangement. But they also apply just about as much to an executive working under subjection to a group of counselors, which is an arrangement that some people think is necessary to our new Constitution. But a shrewd, well-mastered plot within those counselors could distract and paralyze the entire administration. Even without a devious plot, the various views and opinions would be enough to tarnish the way the executive carries out his duties with a spirit of habitual weakness and delay.
But one of the most serious problems with having more than one executive -- and we saw this issue with the first plan as well as the last one [the Articles of Confederation] -- is that it has a tendency to conceal faults and minimize responsibility [which keeps the executive accountable].
There are two kinds of responsibility -- the responsibility of reprimanding, and the responsibility of punishing. The first one -- reprimanding -- is the more important one, especially in a position that is gained with votes. A man who is acting in the public trust is more likely to do something shady and untrustworthy than to commit an outright crime that's legally punishable. But with more than one executive, it's hard to detect unworthy behavior of either kind. When both executives are accusing each other, it's almost impossible to tell who is to blame for destructive actions, and to know who should be punished. The blame is shifted from to the other so nimbly and with such persuasive appearances, that the public has no idea who is really the guilty party. The circumstances that led to some national failure or disaster can be so complicated that when there are more individuals involved who may have different amounts of influence, we may be able to determine that there was clearly some mismanagement, but have no way of knowing who is responsible for it.
'I was overruled by my council; my council members were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible for any better decision to be made.' This is the kind of thing we hear all the time, whether it's true or not. And who is going to take the trouble, or risk the disapproval, of digging into what really happened behind closed doors? If there was any citizen zealous enough to undertake such a sinister task, what would happen if he found some conspiracy between the executive and the council? It would be all too easy for them to cover it up under such vague excuses that there would be no way to determine with certainty what each party did or didn't do.
In the only instance where the governor of New York is joined to a council, specifically in their joint role of appointing people to official positions [NY's "Council of Appointment" appointed all state, county and municipal officials], we have seen this system cause trouble. Disreputable people have been appointed to important positions. Some cases of this have been so atrocious that people from both parties have agreed about how disgracefully it was done. When it was looked into, the governor blamed the council, and the council blamed the governor! Meanwhile, the people had no way to determine which one was guilty of betraying their interests by placing them in such unqualified hands through corrupt means. Out of respect for individuals, I won't go into too much detail. [George Clinton was NY's governor at this time.]
Thus we see that a divided executive branch tends to deprive the people of two of the most valuable protections they have to keep their delegated authorities accountable: first, the restraining influence of public opinion, which loses its effectiveness when nobody knows who to blame for bad decisions; and second, the opportunity to find out easily and clearly whether a trusted official has misbehaved so that the representative can be removed from office or punished.
In England, the king is a permanent magistrate [civil officer who administers the law]. It is said that, for the sake of public peace, he does not have to answer to his administration, and he himself is considered as sacred. So it makes sense in that kind of a government to attach the king to a constitutional council of men who can be responsible to the nation for the advice they give to the king. If not for that, there would be no responsibility whatsoever in the executive branch [the king could be a tyrant, and nobody would be able to stop him]. The very idea is unthinkable in a government of free people. But even when the king is connected with a group of counselors, he is not obliged to do what they advise him, even though they have to answer for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of what he does in carrying out his role. He can listen to his counselors' advice or ignore it, it's completely up to him.
But in a republic, where every official must be personally responsible for his actions while he's in office, the circumstances that make a council a prudent idea in Britain's government don't apply. In fact, a council works against a republican system of government. With a monarchy, the council helps to keep the king accountable. In a sense, it holds national justice hostage in return for his good behavior. But in the American republic, it would have the opposite effect. It would greatly diminish or even destroy the accountability of the executive.
The concept of attaching a council to the executive branch, like so many State constitutions do, comes from those who don't like the idea of a republic and assume that power is safer in the hands of a group of people rather than in the hands of a single individual. If that assumption could be applied to this case, I would still say that the advantages of dividing the executive branch wouldn't make up for the disadvantages. But, in any case, I don't think that applies to the executive power. I agree with the writer whom Junius referred to as 'profound, rational, and brilliant.' That writer said that 'the executive officer is more easily restrained when he is just one person.' It's a lot easier for the people to keep a watchful, wary eye on a single person. No matter how you look at it, multiple people sharing the executive office is more of a threat than a benefit to liberty.
[Junius was an anonymous British writer who wrote letters criticizing King George III. The 'profound, rational, brilliant' writer he was referring to was Jean Louis de Lolme, who advocated for a republic in his book 'The Constitution of England.']
If we reflect just a little, we'll see that the kind of security that's sought by sharing the executive office can't be had. There would have to be so many people sharing that office that they'd never agree on anything, and that would create a situation of danger, not security. The combined clout and influence of several individuals working together would be more of a menace to liberty than the clout and influence of any of those individuals working separately. When that much power is put into the hands of a small enough number of men, their interests and opinions could unite around a common agenda if they're directed by a skilled leader. Such a group becomes more susceptible to corruption, and more dangerous if that combined power is abused, than if that power is in the hands of a single individual. One individual alone will be more carefully watched and more readily suspected, so he won't be as capable of merging a lot of influence as he could if he was working with others. The ten-member Decemvirs of Rome aroused more fear that they would usurp the government than any one of the men individually could have. Nobody would think seriously of dividing the executive branch into much more than ten -- generally, six to twelve is what people suggest for an executive council. Even twelve is a small enough group for them to agree and unite, so America would have more to fear from such a group than they would have to fear from any single man's ambition. A group of council-members attached to an executive who is accountable for what he does will usually impede his good intentions, while being the accessories and accomplices of his bad intentions, and they will almost always provide a cloak to hide his faults.
I won't dwell on the subject of how much it would cost to pay all of these council-members. Of course, if there are enough council-members to accomplish what this kind of system is supposed to do, then the salaries of all of these men, who will have to leave their homes to live in the capital, would be quite an expense for an arrangement that's of doubtful efficiency. I'll only add this thought: before the new Constitution was written up, I rarely met any intelligent man from any State who had experienced this kind of arrangement [an executive council in his state] who didn't admit that New York's structure of unity within the executive branch [one governor as the sole executive] was one of the best features of New York's state constitution.
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
by Alexander Hamilton, May 28, 1788.
To: the people of New York,
Some people say that a strong executive branch [president] conflicts with the genius of republican government. Those enlightened friends of republican government must be hoping that their criticism has no basis because it's impossible for them to acknowledge its truth without condemning their own principles. A powerful executive is an important component in a good government. It is essential in order to protect the country against foreign attacks, to consistently carry out the laws, to protect property against improper and overbearing combinations that sometimes interfere with routine justice, to protect liberty against schemes and violations that might come from overly ambitious politicians, divisive factions, or even anarchy. Anyone who is even a little familiar with Roman history knows how often their republic had to be protected by taking refuge in the absolute power of a single man who was considered a Dictator. He protected the republic from the schemes of ambitious men who wanted to be tyrants, from entire classes of society who rebelled and threatened anarchy, or from the invasion of foreign enemies who threatened to conquer and destroy Rome.
We don't need to bring up more arguments or examples on this subject. A weak, feeble executive means the government will be carried out weakly and feebly. A government carried out weakly and feebly is just another way of saying the government is carried out badly, and a badly carried out government, no matter what kind of high-minded ideals it may rest on, is just a bad government in its actual practice.
If we assume that all sensible men will agree that a powerful executive is needed, the only thing left to ask is: what ingredients are necessary to make up this power? How much can those ingredients be combined with everything else that creates safety in the republican sense? And how close is this combination to what was written in the new Constitution?
These are the ingredients that make up power in the Executive branch: 1. unity; 2. duration; 3. enough provisions for its support; 4. competent authority.
These are the ingredients that make up safety in the republican sense: 1. the proper dependence on the people [votes]; 2. the proper accountability.
The most respected, reasonable, and fair-minded statesmen have supported government with a single executive [one person, not a team], and a legislature with many members. They have correctly considered that energetic drive is the most important requirement for the executive, and that this works best in a single person. And they have also correctly considered that the legislature is the most suited for thoughtful debate and wisdom, and best able to satisfy the the people's confidence and protect their privileges and interests.
Nobody will deny that unity promotes periods of activity. One single man [a unity of one] will be more able to make decisions, put plans into action, keep secrets, and communicate effectively than a group of people. In fact, the more people are involved, the more these activities will be hampered.
Unity can be neutralized in two ways -- either by spreading the authority equally between two or more leaders, or by giving it to one man and then making him submit to the control and co-operation of others who are supposed to counsel him. Two or more leaders is the situation Rome had with its Consuls. And some of the state constitutions provide models of a leader in subjection to counselors. Only New York and New Jersey give their governors full executive control. There are some who promote either of these ways of neutralizing the unity of a single leader, but the method of having executive counselors is the most popular. Both methods are prone to the same issues, so they can usually be considered together.
We don't have very many examples from other countries to demonstrate how a weakened executive branch works. But the few examples we do have show that two equal executives isn't a good idea. The Achaens [ancient Greece] tried having two praetors, but the problems it caused made them abolish one of the positions. Roman history records many situations where the republic was endangered because of conflict between their Consuls, or between their military Tribunes who sometimes took the place of Consuls. But we never see any times that Rome benefited from having more than one leader. We might wonder why conflict between leaders wasn't more common, or even more violent -- until we realize that, more often, they had a single leader, and when they did have two Consuls, they also had a prudent policy of dividing [rather than sharing] the government between them. The aristocratic patricians were perpetually struggling with the lower class plebeians to preserve their ancient authority and dignity. Consuls usually came from the patricians and were usually united by a common personal interest in defending the privilege of their class. Besides this motivation for working together, once the republic was larger due to conquering other nations, it became customary for Consuls to divide the administration by lot [much like drawing straws or flipping a coin] so that one of them would stay at home and govern the city of Rome, and the other would govern the more distant provinces. Separating them like this probably helped to prevent the bickerings and rivalries that might threaten the peace of the republic.
If we leave the dim light of historical research, and focus only on reason and common sense, we'll find even more cause to reject the idea of plurality in the executive branch, no matter which method is used to achieve that plurality.
Any time two or more people are engaged in the same project, there's always a risk of them having a difference of opinion. Whether it's a public trust [something that belongs to the public but is managed by a representative] or a public office where two or more officials have equal dignity and equal authority, there is a distinct danger of personal envy or even hostility, leading to bitter dissensions. When this happens, the authority of the position is weakened and the respectability of the office is diminished. The plans and projects of those they divide are distracted as those people take sides and become involved in bickering amongst themselves. When this happens with multiple leaders within the highest executive office of a country, it could cause important government actions to be frustrated or delayed during critical emergencies of the country. Even worse, they might split the community into violent and hostile factions, siding with one or the other of the leaders.
Sometimes people are against a thing simply because they didn't get to help plan it, or because it was planned by someone they didn't like. Or, if they were consulted and don't approve of the final concept, they become personally offended and feel bound by honor and by all their personal convictions of infallible rightness to defeat the success of the measure because of their personal disagreement. Decent, generous men have had too many opportunities to see, with horror, what lengths people with this disposition will go to, and how often the highest interests of society are sacrificed to the personal vanity, conceit, or stubbornness of individuals whose passions and impulses make them interesting personalities. It's possible that the question of whether or not to ratify the new Constitution will bring out examples of this disgraceful weakness -- or, rather, this hateful depravity -- in human nature.
In a free government, there will be inconveniences like this in the legislative branch [because the legislature is made up of many members], but it's not necessary to introduce that kind of potential for conflict in the executive branch, and it's also unwise. In fact, in the highest level of leadership, it's downright dangerous. In a legislature, being able to make hasty decisions is more of an evil than a benefit. The various opinions and clashing of parties in the legislative branch can sometimes obstruct beneficial plans, but they also encourage reflection, discussion, and caution. They also curb excesses in the majority. But once the vote has been taken and an issue is resolved, opposition ends. The bill that was so hotly debated becomes a law, and resisting it becomes a crime. [The conflict served a purpose, but is resolved peacefully.] But there are no benefits that can make up for conflict within the executive branch. Within the executive branch, conflict is pure and unmixed. There is no point where an issue is resolved and conflict ceases. Conflict only causes embarrassment and weakens the plan when it's carried out, all the way from the first step to the final conclusion. Bickering counteracts the qualities that are necessary to an efficient executive -- dynamic power and swift action. It hinders these without providing any benefit to make up for it. In time of war, when the strength of the President is the safeguard of national security, the disadvantages of having more than one man in charge would be a drawback.
Admittedly, these observations would be a bigger issue with two executives of equal rank, and not many will be supporting that particular arrangement. But they also apply just about as much to an executive working under subjection to a group of counselors, which is an arrangement that some people think is necessary to our new Constitution. But a shrewd, well-mastered plot within those counselors could distract and paralyze the entire administration. Even without a devious plot, the various views and opinions would be enough to tarnish the way the executive carries out his duties with a spirit of habitual weakness and delay.
But one of the most serious problems with having more than one executive -- and we saw this issue with the first plan as well as the last one [the Articles of Confederation] -- is that it has a tendency to conceal faults and minimize responsibility [which keeps the executive accountable].
There are two kinds of responsibility -- the responsibility of reprimanding, and the responsibility of punishing. The first one -- reprimanding -- is the more important one, especially in a position that is gained with votes. A man who is acting in the public trust is more likely to do something shady and untrustworthy than to commit an outright crime that's legally punishable. But with more than one executive, it's hard to detect unworthy behavior of either kind. When both executives are accusing each other, it's almost impossible to tell who is to blame for destructive actions, and to know who should be punished. The blame is shifted from to the other so nimbly and with such persuasive appearances, that the public has no idea who is really the guilty party. The circumstances that led to some national failure or disaster can be so complicated that when there are more individuals involved who may have different amounts of influence, we may be able to determine that there was clearly some mismanagement, but have no way of knowing who is responsible for it.
'I was overruled by my council; my council members were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible for any better decision to be made.' This is the kind of thing we hear all the time, whether it's true or not. And who is going to take the trouble, or risk the disapproval, of digging into what really happened behind closed doors? If there was any citizen zealous enough to undertake such a sinister task, what would happen if he found some conspiracy between the executive and the council? It would be all too easy for them to cover it up under such vague excuses that there would be no way to determine with certainty what each party did or didn't do.
In the only instance where the governor of New York is joined to a council, specifically in their joint role of appointing people to official positions [NY's "Council of Appointment" appointed all state, county and municipal officials], we have seen this system cause trouble. Disreputable people have been appointed to important positions. Some cases of this have been so atrocious that people from both parties have agreed about how disgracefully it was done. When it was looked into, the governor blamed the council, and the council blamed the governor! Meanwhile, the people had no way to determine which one was guilty of betraying their interests by placing them in such unqualified hands through corrupt means. Out of respect for individuals, I won't go into too much detail. [George Clinton was NY's governor at this time.]
Thus we see that a divided executive branch tends to deprive the people of two of the most valuable protections they have to keep their delegated authorities accountable: first, the restraining influence of public opinion, which loses its effectiveness when nobody knows who to blame for bad decisions; and second, the opportunity to find out easily and clearly whether a trusted official has misbehaved so that the representative can be removed from office or punished.
In England, the king is a permanent magistrate [civil officer who administers the law]. It is said that, for the sake of public peace, he does not have to answer to his administration, and he himself is considered as sacred. So it makes sense in that kind of a government to attach the king to a constitutional council of men who can be responsible to the nation for the advice they give to the king. If not for that, there would be no responsibility whatsoever in the executive branch [the king could be a tyrant, and nobody would be able to stop him]. The very idea is unthinkable in a government of free people. But even when the king is connected with a group of counselors, he is not obliged to do what they advise him, even though they have to answer for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of what he does in carrying out his role. He can listen to his counselors' advice or ignore it, it's completely up to him.
But in a republic, where every official must be personally responsible for his actions while he's in office, the circumstances that make a council a prudent idea in Britain's government don't apply. In fact, a council works against a republican system of government. With a monarchy, the council helps to keep the king accountable. In a sense, it holds national justice hostage in return for his good behavior. But in the American republic, it would have the opposite effect. It would greatly diminish or even destroy the accountability of the executive.
The concept of attaching a council to the executive branch, like so many State constitutions do, comes from those who don't like the idea of a republic and assume that power is safer in the hands of a group of people rather than in the hands of a single individual. If that assumption could be applied to this case, I would still say that the advantages of dividing the executive branch wouldn't make up for the disadvantages. But, in any case, I don't think that applies to the executive power. I agree with the writer whom Junius referred to as 'profound, rational, and brilliant.' That writer said that 'the executive officer is more easily restrained when he is just one person.' It's a lot easier for the people to keep a watchful, wary eye on a single person. No matter how you look at it, multiple people sharing the executive office is more of a threat than a benefit to liberty.
[Junius was an anonymous British writer who wrote letters criticizing King George III. The 'profound, rational, brilliant' writer he was referring to was Jean Louis de Lolme, who advocated for a republic in his book 'The Constitution of England.']
If we reflect just a little, we'll see that the kind of security that's sought by sharing the executive office can't be had. There would have to be so many people sharing that office that they'd never agree on anything, and that would create a situation of danger, not security. The combined clout and influence of several individuals working together would be more of a menace to liberty than the clout and influence of any of those individuals working separately. When that much power is put into the hands of a small enough number of men, their interests and opinions could unite around a common agenda if they're directed by a skilled leader. Such a group becomes more susceptible to corruption, and more dangerous if that combined power is abused, than if that power is in the hands of a single individual. One individual alone will be more carefully watched and more readily suspected, so he won't be as capable of merging a lot of influence as he could if he was working with others. The ten-member Decemvirs of Rome aroused more fear that they would usurp the government than any one of the men individually could have. Nobody would think seriously of dividing the executive branch into much more than ten -- generally, six to twelve is what people suggest for an executive council. Even twelve is a small enough group for them to agree and unite, so America would have more to fear from such a group than they would have to fear from any single man's ambition. A group of council-members attached to an executive who is accountable for what he does will usually impede his good intentions, while being the accessories and accomplices of his bad intentions, and they will almost always provide a cloak to hide his faults.
I won't dwell on the subject of how much it would cost to pay all of these council-members. Of course, if there are enough council-members to accomplish what this kind of system is supposed to do, then the salaries of all of these men, who will have to leave their homes to live in the capital, would be quite an expense for an arrangement that's of doubtful efficiency. I'll only add this thought: before the new Constitution was written up, I rarely met any intelligent man from any State who had experienced this kind of arrangement [an executive council in his state] who didn't admit that New York's structure of unity within the executive branch [one governor as the sole executive] was one of the best features of New York's state constitution.
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
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