Federalist 78 Paraphrased
The Federalist Number 78: The Judiciary Branch paraphrased into Modern English
by Alexander Hamilton, May 28, 1788.
To: the people of New York,
Let's take a look at the judicial branch of the proposed government.
When we discussed the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation, we brought up the usefulness and necessity of having a federal justice system.
It's not necessary to rehash the considerations that have already been urged since nobody disputes the principle that some kind of federal justice system is needed. The problem is deciding how to set one up, and the extent of jurisdiction that it will have. So I'll limit my comments to those considerations.
How to set it up involves three considerations: 1. How to appoint judges. 2. How long a term judges should serve. 3. Where the boundary of authority is between the different courts [which cases are decided by State courts, and which by the federal court], and the relationship of those courts to each other.
First. The method for appointing judges will be the same as it is for appointing other federal officials in general. That has been explained thoroughly in the last two articles. Anything I say here about that will just be redundant.
Second. How long a term judges should serve also involves how they will be paid, and precautions to allow the judicial branch to carry out their purpose [to prevent them from over-reach of the other two branches so they can do what they're supposed to: protect the liberty and justice of the people].
According to the new Constitution, all judges who are appointed by the United States will hold their offices during good behavior [as long as they behave with integrity; a judge can be impeached for misconduct]. This is how it's done in most established State constitutions, including New York's. The opposition has questioned this part of the plan. Their objection has been become so focused on this issue that their animosity has fueled their imaginations and affected their judgments. The standard of "good behavior" in order for a federal judge to remain in office is one of the best improvements for a government. In a monarchy, this provides an excellent barrier to a king's tyranny. In a republic, it's just as good a barrier against the infringement and oppression of the government leaders themselves. It is also the best strategy that any government can create to guarantee that laws are administrated consistently, honestly, and impartially.
Anyone who carefully reflects on the different branches of government must realize that in a government where the branches are separate from each other, the judicial branch will always be the least threat to the political rights that the Constitution protects because of the nature of the judicial's duties. It will be the least able to threaten or abuse those rights. The Executive distributes the honors, but also holds the sword of the community [he executes, or enforces, the laws that are passed]. The legislature [lawmaking branch] controls the money and determines the rules that manage the duties and rights of every citizen. But the judicial branch does not manage the sword or the money. It has no control over the strength of the people or their wealth. It isn't able to take any active resolution whatsoever. It has neither force nor will; all it has is the ability to make judgments, and it has to rely on the help of the president to even put its judgments into effect.
This simplified explanation of the matter suggests a few notable results. It proves very clearly that, without question, the judiciary is the weakest of all three branches of government. It can never successfully attack either of the other two branches. In fact, careful precautions are needed to defend the judiciary against attacks from the other two branches! It also proves that, even though isolated oppression may come from the federal court, the general liberty of the people can never be threatened from the federal court system -- not as long as the judicial branch remains separate and distinct from both the legislative and the Executive branches. I agree with Montesquieu that 'if the authority to judge isn't separated from the legislative and executive powers, there can be no liberty.' And, finally, it proves that since:
-- liberty doesn't have anything to fear from the judicial system by itself, but would have everything to fear if the judicial branch joined with either of the other branches,
-- the results of the judiciary joining with either of the other two branches would come from the judicial branch having to depend on those branches in spite of being separated only in name and appearance,
-- the judiciary's natural weakness makes it continually in danger of being overpowered, intimidated, or influenced by the other two branches,
-- the best way to help the judiciary remain strong and independent is to provide the role of federal judge with permanency --
therefore, the stipulation that judges will hold their offices during good behavior can be considered the most essential element in the judiciary's structure, as well as a fortress to protect public justice and public security.
A court system that is completely independent is especially important when you have a limited Constitution. When I say limited Constitution, I mean a Constitution that lists specific limits to the legislative branch -- such as not being allowed to pass a Bill of Attainder [a law that makes someone guilty before he has had a fair trial] or an ex facto law [a retroactive law that punishes someone for doing something that wasn't illegal at the time he did it]. The only way these kinds of limitations can work in practice is by having independent courts that can declare such laws contrary to the Constitution and thus invalid. Without that, all the provisions for particular rights or privileges are meaningless.
There is some confusion about the courts' rights to declare that a law passed by the legislature is invalid. In spite of what the Constitution says, some have imagined that this makes the courts superior over the legislature. Critics claim that any branch of government that has the authority to declare that the actions of another branch are invalid must be superior. This concept is important in all of the American constitutions [such as state constitutions], so we need to discuss how it works.
It is absolutely imperative that any action that a delegated official does that is contrary to the intent of the Constitution is invalid. Therefore, no law that is contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To disagree with this would be like saying that an assistant has authority over his boss, or that a servant is above his master, or the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves, or that men with power can not only do what their delegated role does not authorize, but what it actually forbids.
Perhaps someone will say that the legislative branch is capable of deciding for itself whether its actions are constitutional or not, and that the way the legislators interpret the Constitution should control the other branches of government. But that isn't the case, and nothing in the Constitution gives them the authority to do that. Nor is it correct that anything in the Constitution was ever intended to enable the representatives to impose their own will over that of their constituents [the people they represent]. It is much more reasonable to conclude that the courts were designed to be an intermediary buffer between the people and the legislature in order to confine the legislature within the limits of the authority they were assigned. Interpreting laws is something the courts -- and no one else -- should do. A constitution is a fundamental law and the federal judges should regard it that way. That makes it their job to determine the Constitution's intended meaning, as well as the implications of any laws that the legislators pass. If there is a conflict between the Constitution and a law that gets passed, the Constitution takes precedence because it is the higher authority and is the most valid of the two. In other words, the Constitution should be preferred over any law, and the intention of the people should be preferred over the intentions of their representatives.
This does not mean that the judicial branch is superior or more powerful than the legislative branch. In fact, the power of the people is superior to either branch. Any time the will of the legislature and its laws is opposed to the will of the people and their Constitution, the judicial system should regard the people and their Constitution over and above the legislators. The courts should base their decisions on the foundational laws [that are stated in the Constitution] rather than any nonessential laws [that the legislative branch tries to impose on the people].
Here's a familiar situation that will illustrate how judicial deliberation will decide between two laws that contradict each other. It's not uncommon for two laws to exist at the same time that clash with each other, either wholly, or in part, and with neither of them having any clause or provision to be repealed. In such a case, it's the courts who change those laws by determining what they will mean and how they will work. Reason and law work together to find a way to construct the laws so that both of them can work together as much as possible. If that isn't practical, then the court has to determine which law will stay and which will be canceled out. Generally, the court decides that the more recent law will cancel out the older one. This is just the way these kinds of decisions have evolved; there's no law that says it must be this way, it just seems like the most reasonable action. There is no rule decreed by the legislature that says it has to be this way, but they have done it this way because it seems appropriate and suitable for the courts to use this precedent when they interpret laws. It makes sense that when two equal authorities make laws that contradicted each other, the most recent one will be preferred.
But what about two contradictory laws created by a higher primary authority and a lower authority that's derived from the higher one and subordinate to it? In that case, it makes more sense to do the reverse. It's more reasonable for the earlier law of the higher authority to be preferred over the more recent law of the inferior and subordinate authority. In the same way, any time a law contradicts the Constitution, it will be the duty of the federal courts to heed the Constitution and disregard the newer law that contradicts it.
It would be counterproductive for the courts to claim they disliked a particular law that Congress passed, and then substitute their own desire for the Constitutional intentions of the legislature. Similarly, imagine if they simply chose their own personal preference in the case of the two contradictory laws. What if they did that when judging every single law? That would be wrong; the courts must determine the actual meaning and implication of the law. If they were to start exercising their own will instead of their unbiased judgment, it would be the same as if they substituted their own desire for what Congress legislated. If that happened, what would be the point of having any judges separate from the legislative branch?
But if the courts of justice are going to be an effective defense to fortify a limited Constitution from attacks against infringements from the legislative branch [Congress], then judges should have permanent positions. Nothing will endow the judges with the independent spirit they need to faithfully do their duty than permanence in office [because they won't be beholden or obligated to the legislature to keep their position].
Independent judges are also necessary in order to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from rash resolutions that crafty men, or the influence of certain occurrences can spread among the people. Before better information and more deliberate reflection causes the people to relent, they might demand dangerous and radical changes in the government that could seriously oppress the minority party in the community. I hope that those who approve of the new Constitution will never agree with its opponents who distrust the fundamental principle of a republican form of government because it gives the people the right to change or dissolve the established Constitution any time they discover that it seems at odds with their happiness. They shouldn't conclude that any time a majority of the people has a whim that contradicts provisions in the Constitution, that the legislature would be justified in violating those Constitutional provisions. They shouldn't conclude that the courts would be more obligated to authorize violations of those provisions when the majority clamored for them than they would be when legislators conspired to violate those provisions. The Constitution is binding on the people collectively and individually until the people dissolve or amend the Constitution by an earnest and official decision. No presumption of the people's wishes, or even an actual confirmed certainty of their wishes, is enough to justify the legislature in violating the provisions of the Constitution -- not until the people earnestly and officially dissolve or amend the Constitution. But it's easy to see that when a majority of voices from the people motivates the legislature to violate the Constitution, it would take an extraordinary quantity of courage and determination for the judges to do their duty and faithfully guard the Constitution.
Independent judges can be an essential safeguard from the occasional misjudgment of the people against more than Constitutional violations. Sometimes society's hasty imprudence prompts unjust and biased laws that abuse the personal rights of a particular class of citizens. This is another situation where a firm judicial system can allay the severity of such laws by confining how they're carried out. Besides minimizing the damage of laws that get passed, a firm judicial system will help to prevent the legislators from passing them in the first place because they'll realize that the courts are likely to block insidious attempts at passing unjust laws. It will prompt them to consider carefully any laws they try to get by. This is an ingenious mechanism designed to have a positive influence on the character of our governments [federal and state], although few may be aware of it. More than one State has already benefited from the integrity of their judicial system in acting as a check on their legislature. Although corrupt people with malevolent designs might have been disappointed by the judicial system thwarting their plans, the courts' action drew respect and approval from all virtuous and impartial people. Mindful men of all kinds ought to appreciate anything [such as permanence of position] that will increase that kind of tendency in the courts. After all, nobody knows when a spirit of injustice that benefits them in the short term may make them the next victim. ["First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out because I was not a socialist. . ."] Every person must have a sense that the inevitable result of that kind of unjust spirit is to erode the foundation of public and private confidence and replace it with general suspicion and distress.
Adhering with an uncompromising and uniform commitment to the rights listed in the Constitution is indispensable in the courts of justice, and can't be expected to result from judges who have a temporary position. No matter who appoints judges, or however well that process of appointments is managed, if the position is temporary, that will kill any spirit of independence that's necessary for the judges to be completely unbiased. If either the President or the legislators made those appointments, there would be a risk of the judges improperly acceding to whichever branch can get them reappointed. If both branches made judicial appointments, the judges would be afraid of displeasing either of them. If representatives were to make the selections [like an electoral college], judges might be tempted to do whatever will appeal to the popularity of the people. Judges should not be influenced by the need to appease government officials or the popular vote. They should be free to consult nothing but the Constitution and the laws.
But there's an even more serious reason that judicial positions should be permanent. It has to do with the qualifications that a judge needs. A vast code of laws is one of the inconveniences that comes with the advantages of a free government. To prevent the judges from making arbitrary decisions, they need to be bound by strict rules and precedents that define and point out their duty in every particular case that they decide. The foolishness and wickedness of mankind gives rise to all sorts of controversies, which results in a considerable bulk of court records that require long, tedious study to acquire an adequate knowledge of them. Thus, there are only a handful of men in society who will be sufficiently qualified to be judges. When some individuals from that already limited pool are weeded out because of a lack of uprightness due to ordinary human depravity, there will be an even smaller number of options who have both the necessary integrity and knowledge. Thus, the number of judges to draw from is already severely limited. If federal judges are temporary appointments, that would discourage a man of character from leaving his successful private practice to accept a seat on the federal court. That means the government would have to rely on less capable, less qualified judges to carry out justice efficiently and with dignity. Considering the present circumstances of our country which are likely to continue for some time, this is a disadvantage that would be worse than it might appear to be, though the other aspects of the subject [judges beholden to others to maintain their positions] are bad enough.
Considering everything, it seems that copying other States' method of appointing judges for as long as they maintain good behavior was a wise move. This is not a flaw. In fact, if this feature hadn't been written in, the Constitution would be unpardonably defective. The experience of Great Britain [whose judges also served "during good behaviour"] provides a wonderful observation of how well this system can work.
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
by Alexander Hamilton, May 28, 1788.
To: the people of New York,
Let's take a look at the judicial branch of the proposed government.
When we discussed the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation, we brought up the usefulness and necessity of having a federal justice system.
It's not necessary to rehash the considerations that have already been urged since nobody disputes the principle that some kind of federal justice system is needed. The problem is deciding how to set one up, and the extent of jurisdiction that it will have. So I'll limit my comments to those considerations.
How to set it up involves three considerations: 1. How to appoint judges. 2. How long a term judges should serve. 3. Where the boundary of authority is between the different courts [which cases are decided by State courts, and which by the federal court], and the relationship of those courts to each other.
First. The method for appointing judges will be the same as it is for appointing other federal officials in general. That has been explained thoroughly in the last two articles. Anything I say here about that will just be redundant.
Second. How long a term judges should serve also involves how they will be paid, and precautions to allow the judicial branch to carry out their purpose [to prevent them from over-reach of the other two branches so they can do what they're supposed to: protect the liberty and justice of the people].
According to the new Constitution, all judges who are appointed by the United States will hold their offices during good behavior [as long as they behave with integrity; a judge can be impeached for misconduct]. This is how it's done in most established State constitutions, including New York's. The opposition has questioned this part of the plan. Their objection has been become so focused on this issue that their animosity has fueled their imaginations and affected their judgments. The standard of "good behavior" in order for a federal judge to remain in office is one of the best improvements for a government. In a monarchy, this provides an excellent barrier to a king's tyranny. In a republic, it's just as good a barrier against the infringement and oppression of the government leaders themselves. It is also the best strategy that any government can create to guarantee that laws are administrated consistently, honestly, and impartially.
Anyone who carefully reflects on the different branches of government must realize that in a government where the branches are separate from each other, the judicial branch will always be the least threat to the political rights that the Constitution protects because of the nature of the judicial's duties. It will be the least able to threaten or abuse those rights. The Executive distributes the honors, but also holds the sword of the community [he executes, or enforces, the laws that are passed]. The legislature [lawmaking branch] controls the money and determines the rules that manage the duties and rights of every citizen. But the judicial branch does not manage the sword or the money. It has no control over the strength of the people or their wealth. It isn't able to take any active resolution whatsoever. It has neither force nor will; all it has is the ability to make judgments, and it has to rely on the help of the president to even put its judgments into effect.
This simplified explanation of the matter suggests a few notable results. It proves very clearly that, without question, the judiciary is the weakest of all three branches of government. It can never successfully attack either of the other two branches. In fact, careful precautions are needed to defend the judiciary against attacks from the other two branches! It also proves that, even though isolated oppression may come from the federal court, the general liberty of the people can never be threatened from the federal court system -- not as long as the judicial branch remains separate and distinct from both the legislative and the Executive branches. I agree with Montesquieu that 'if the authority to judge isn't separated from the legislative and executive powers, there can be no liberty.' And, finally, it proves that since:
-- liberty doesn't have anything to fear from the judicial system by itself, but would have everything to fear if the judicial branch joined with either of the other branches,
-- the results of the judiciary joining with either of the other two branches would come from the judicial branch having to depend on those branches in spite of being separated only in name and appearance,
-- the judiciary's natural weakness makes it continually in danger of being overpowered, intimidated, or influenced by the other two branches,
-- the best way to help the judiciary remain strong and independent is to provide the role of federal judge with permanency --
therefore, the stipulation that judges will hold their offices during good behavior can be considered the most essential element in the judiciary's structure, as well as a fortress to protect public justice and public security.
A court system that is completely independent is especially important when you have a limited Constitution. When I say limited Constitution, I mean a Constitution that lists specific limits to the legislative branch -- such as not being allowed to pass a Bill of Attainder [a law that makes someone guilty before he has had a fair trial] or an ex facto law [a retroactive law that punishes someone for doing something that wasn't illegal at the time he did it]. The only way these kinds of limitations can work in practice is by having independent courts that can declare such laws contrary to the Constitution and thus invalid. Without that, all the provisions for particular rights or privileges are meaningless.
There is some confusion about the courts' rights to declare that a law passed by the legislature is invalid. In spite of what the Constitution says, some have imagined that this makes the courts superior over the legislature. Critics claim that any branch of government that has the authority to declare that the actions of another branch are invalid must be superior. This concept is important in all of the American constitutions [such as state constitutions], so we need to discuss how it works.
It is absolutely imperative that any action that a delegated official does that is contrary to the intent of the Constitution is invalid. Therefore, no law that is contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To disagree with this would be like saying that an assistant has authority over his boss, or that a servant is above his master, or the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves, or that men with power can not only do what their delegated role does not authorize, but what it actually forbids.
Perhaps someone will say that the legislative branch is capable of deciding for itself whether its actions are constitutional or not, and that the way the legislators interpret the Constitution should control the other branches of government. But that isn't the case, and nothing in the Constitution gives them the authority to do that. Nor is it correct that anything in the Constitution was ever intended to enable the representatives to impose their own will over that of their constituents [the people they represent]. It is much more reasonable to conclude that the courts were designed to be an intermediary buffer between the people and the legislature in order to confine the legislature within the limits of the authority they were assigned. Interpreting laws is something the courts -- and no one else -- should do. A constitution is a fundamental law and the federal judges should regard it that way. That makes it their job to determine the Constitution's intended meaning, as well as the implications of any laws that the legislators pass. If there is a conflict between the Constitution and a law that gets passed, the Constitution takes precedence because it is the higher authority and is the most valid of the two. In other words, the Constitution should be preferred over any law, and the intention of the people should be preferred over the intentions of their representatives.
This does not mean that the judicial branch is superior or more powerful than the legislative branch. In fact, the power of the people is superior to either branch. Any time the will of the legislature and its laws is opposed to the will of the people and their Constitution, the judicial system should regard the people and their Constitution over and above the legislators. The courts should base their decisions on the foundational laws [that are stated in the Constitution] rather than any nonessential laws [that the legislative branch tries to impose on the people].
Here's a familiar situation that will illustrate how judicial deliberation will decide between two laws that contradict each other. It's not uncommon for two laws to exist at the same time that clash with each other, either wholly, or in part, and with neither of them having any clause or provision to be repealed. In such a case, it's the courts who change those laws by determining what they will mean and how they will work. Reason and law work together to find a way to construct the laws so that both of them can work together as much as possible. If that isn't practical, then the court has to determine which law will stay and which will be canceled out. Generally, the court decides that the more recent law will cancel out the older one. This is just the way these kinds of decisions have evolved; there's no law that says it must be this way, it just seems like the most reasonable action. There is no rule decreed by the legislature that says it has to be this way, but they have done it this way because it seems appropriate and suitable for the courts to use this precedent when they interpret laws. It makes sense that when two equal authorities make laws that contradicted each other, the most recent one will be preferred.
But what about two contradictory laws created by a higher primary authority and a lower authority that's derived from the higher one and subordinate to it? In that case, it makes more sense to do the reverse. It's more reasonable for the earlier law of the higher authority to be preferred over the more recent law of the inferior and subordinate authority. In the same way, any time a law contradicts the Constitution, it will be the duty of the federal courts to heed the Constitution and disregard the newer law that contradicts it.
It would be counterproductive for the courts to claim they disliked a particular law that Congress passed, and then substitute their own desire for the Constitutional intentions of the legislature. Similarly, imagine if they simply chose their own personal preference in the case of the two contradictory laws. What if they did that when judging every single law? That would be wrong; the courts must determine the actual meaning and implication of the law. If they were to start exercising their own will instead of their unbiased judgment, it would be the same as if they substituted their own desire for what Congress legislated. If that happened, what would be the point of having any judges separate from the legislative branch?
But if the courts of justice are going to be an effective defense to fortify a limited Constitution from attacks against infringements from the legislative branch [Congress], then judges should have permanent positions. Nothing will endow the judges with the independent spirit they need to faithfully do their duty than permanence in office [because they won't be beholden or obligated to the legislature to keep their position].
Independent judges are also necessary in order to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from rash resolutions that crafty men, or the influence of certain occurrences can spread among the people. Before better information and more deliberate reflection causes the people to relent, they might demand dangerous and radical changes in the government that could seriously oppress the minority party in the community. I hope that those who approve of the new Constitution will never agree with its opponents who distrust the fundamental principle of a republican form of government because it gives the people the right to change or dissolve the established Constitution any time they discover that it seems at odds with their happiness. They shouldn't conclude that any time a majority of the people has a whim that contradicts provisions in the Constitution, that the legislature would be justified in violating those Constitutional provisions. They shouldn't conclude that the courts would be more obligated to authorize violations of those provisions when the majority clamored for them than they would be when legislators conspired to violate those provisions. The Constitution is binding on the people collectively and individually until the people dissolve or amend the Constitution by an earnest and official decision. No presumption of the people's wishes, or even an actual confirmed certainty of their wishes, is enough to justify the legislature in violating the provisions of the Constitution -- not until the people earnestly and officially dissolve or amend the Constitution. But it's easy to see that when a majority of voices from the people motivates the legislature to violate the Constitution, it would take an extraordinary quantity of courage and determination for the judges to do their duty and faithfully guard the Constitution.
Independent judges can be an essential safeguard from the occasional misjudgment of the people against more than Constitutional violations. Sometimes society's hasty imprudence prompts unjust and biased laws that abuse the personal rights of a particular class of citizens. This is another situation where a firm judicial system can allay the severity of such laws by confining how they're carried out. Besides minimizing the damage of laws that get passed, a firm judicial system will help to prevent the legislators from passing them in the first place because they'll realize that the courts are likely to block insidious attempts at passing unjust laws. It will prompt them to consider carefully any laws they try to get by. This is an ingenious mechanism designed to have a positive influence on the character of our governments [federal and state], although few may be aware of it. More than one State has already benefited from the integrity of their judicial system in acting as a check on their legislature. Although corrupt people with malevolent designs might have been disappointed by the judicial system thwarting their plans, the courts' action drew respect and approval from all virtuous and impartial people. Mindful men of all kinds ought to appreciate anything [such as permanence of position] that will increase that kind of tendency in the courts. After all, nobody knows when a spirit of injustice that benefits them in the short term may make them the next victim. ["First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out because I was not a socialist. . ."] Every person must have a sense that the inevitable result of that kind of unjust spirit is to erode the foundation of public and private confidence and replace it with general suspicion and distress.
Adhering with an uncompromising and uniform commitment to the rights listed in the Constitution is indispensable in the courts of justice, and can't be expected to result from judges who have a temporary position. No matter who appoints judges, or however well that process of appointments is managed, if the position is temporary, that will kill any spirit of independence that's necessary for the judges to be completely unbiased. If either the President or the legislators made those appointments, there would be a risk of the judges improperly acceding to whichever branch can get them reappointed. If both branches made judicial appointments, the judges would be afraid of displeasing either of them. If representatives were to make the selections [like an electoral college], judges might be tempted to do whatever will appeal to the popularity of the people. Judges should not be influenced by the need to appease government officials or the popular vote. They should be free to consult nothing but the Constitution and the laws.
But there's an even more serious reason that judicial positions should be permanent. It has to do with the qualifications that a judge needs. A vast code of laws is one of the inconveniences that comes with the advantages of a free government. To prevent the judges from making arbitrary decisions, they need to be bound by strict rules and precedents that define and point out their duty in every particular case that they decide. The foolishness and wickedness of mankind gives rise to all sorts of controversies, which results in a considerable bulk of court records that require long, tedious study to acquire an adequate knowledge of them. Thus, there are only a handful of men in society who will be sufficiently qualified to be judges. When some individuals from that already limited pool are weeded out because of a lack of uprightness due to ordinary human depravity, there will be an even smaller number of options who have both the necessary integrity and knowledge. Thus, the number of judges to draw from is already severely limited. If federal judges are temporary appointments, that would discourage a man of character from leaving his successful private practice to accept a seat on the federal court. That means the government would have to rely on less capable, less qualified judges to carry out justice efficiently and with dignity. Considering the present circumstances of our country which are likely to continue for some time, this is a disadvantage that would be worse than it might appear to be, though the other aspects of the subject [judges beholden to others to maintain their positions] are bad enough.
Considering everything, it seems that copying other States' method of appointing judges for as long as they maintain good behavior was a wise move. This is not a flaw. In fact, if this feature hadn't been written in, the Constitution would be unpardonably defective. The experience of Great Britain [whose judges also served "during good behaviour"] provides a wonderful observation of how well this system can work.
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, January-February 2019
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
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