Federalist Paraphrase Comparisons
Paraphrase Comparisons of Eight Selected Federalist Papers
If you're looking for a more modern, easy to read version of the Federalist papers, there are a few choices out there. I paraphrased eight of the Federalist Papers myself, and then read my paraphrase side by side with three other translations, and lined them up with the original, to see how each version compares. All of the ones I reviewed seemed to maintain the gist and spirit of the original article.
You can read all of them in their original language at Project Gutenberg or The Avalon Project.
My own paraphrase is here.
"The Federalist Papers in Modern Language" by Mary E. Webster (pdf; amazon)
"The Original Argument" by Joshua Charles and Glenn Beck (amazon)
"In Other Words" by Marshall Overstedt is a free 134-page PDF.
Gary Alder paraphrased Federalist #1 and Federalist #39.
Federalist Number 1
Original:
You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided.
How I paraphrased it:
It should be obvious to you that I lean towards supporting the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit that I've given the issue a lot of thought and I firmly believe that it is in your best interests to approve it. I think this is the best way to guarantee your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I'm not going to pretend to have sentiments that I don't really feel. I'm not going to pretend to mull over and deliberate over a decision that I've already made.
Mary E Webster:
I'm sure you have noticed that I am not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit that after having given it attentive consideration, I believe it is in your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I don't pretend to have reservations I don't feel. I won't amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
You will find that I am convinced that this Constitution will protect your liberty, dignity, and happiness and, therefore, believe that is in your interests to adopt it. I will not express any feelings to you other than my own, nor waste your time by debating what I have already decided for myself, since I will freely acknowledge my convictions and reasoning behind them.
Marshall Overstedt:
These thoughts are intended to alert you to dishonest objections -- while frankly admitting that I am "friendly" to the new Constitution: I believe ratification is the best way to achieve liberty and assure dignity and happiness.
Gary Alder:
You will, no doubt, realize that I am in favor of the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of the opinion that it is in your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I don't pretend anything which I do not feel. I will not make it appear that I have not made up my mind when I have decided.
Federalist Number 2
Original:
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter . . .
How I paraphrased it:
But this nation is made up of an intelligent people. They saw these defects and they regretted them. They were still as committed to union as they were committed to liberty. They saw the danger that threatened their Union, and might even threaten their liberty.
Mary E Webster:
Being intelligent, the people recognized and regretted the government's defects. They were both attached to the union and enamored with liberty. They observed that the union was in immediate danger, a danger that would eventually jeopardize liberty.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
The intelligent people of this country understood these problems and regretted their existence. During the war, when we were equally in love with both our Union and our liberties, we recognized the imminent danger to our Union more easily than the threat to our liberties.
Marshall Overstedt:
An intelligent people, we recognized and regretted these defects. Still attached to Union and liberty, we saw the immediate danger to the former and the more remote risk to the latter.
Federalist Number 10
Original:
Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. . .
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
How I paraphrased it:
Therefore, the number of representatives might not be in proportion to their constituents. But they will be proportionally greater in a smaller Republic [more representatives, less voters]. If we imagine a case where both the small and large Republic have the same number ratio of representatives [one representative per the same number of people], then the larger Republic will have more options [representatives], which will give a better chance of choosing someone competent. . .
If you widen their sphere, it will include a greater variety of parties and special interests, and that means that it will be harder to get up a majority who will have the same motive in common and be united to infringe on the rights of other citizens. If enough people do share a motive in common, it will be harder for all of those who feel it to be aware of how many strong they are, so they won't be as easily able to come together and act in unison. There are other obstacles, but whenever people have a sense that their motive is unjust or dishonorable, their tendency to reach out and connect with other like-minded people is hindered by their own distrust, and the more people are required to act, the more suspicious each individual will be about reaching out.
Mary E Webster:
Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases are not in the same proportion to their constituents, with the larger proportion in the small republic. If the proportion of qualified people is the same in a large as a small republic, the large republic will present greater options and, consequently, result in a greater probability of a fit choice. . .
Expanding the size adds a greater variety of parties and interests. It becomes less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens. Even if a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for those holding it to discover their combined strength and act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, when a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes exists, communication is limited by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
Since the number of representatives in both cases will not be proportional to the number of constituents (which would be proportionally the greatest in the small republ;ic), and since the proportion of worthy candidates is probably equal in the large as much as it is in the small republic, the larger republic will be the better option. . .
If you increase the number of people involved, you naturally increase the number of parties and interests involved, making it less likely that a majority of the People will have a common motive to invade the rights of their fellow citizens. Even if such a motive existed, it would be more difficult to find like-minded citizens, which would make acting in unison more difficult as well.In addition to other obstacles, it is also true that whenever people areaware of any unjust ot dishonorable motives on the part of others, their communication is always hindered by distrust, which takes place in proportion to the number of people whose agreement is required for any plan of action to move forward.
Marshall Overstedt:
Note that the number of representatives in each case is not in proportion to its constituency, and the small republic has a greater proportion. It follows that if the ratio of fit candidates in the large republic equals that in the small, the large republic will offer more choices a better chance to elect a qualified representative body. . .
But when you widen the fields of interest, including more people, more parties and diverse interests, you make it more difficult for a majority to violate the minority's rights. That limits a faction's opportunity and ability to function. For one reason, it takes many more people to gather critical mass and soon distrust and dissension begin to erode effectiveness.
Federalist Number 14
Original:
I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. . .
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness.
How I paraphrased it:
I will only add that this mistaken notion seems to come from a confusion between a Republic and a democracy, and from applying logic about the nature of a democracy to a Republic. The distinction between the two was also explained in a previous article. Basically, it is this: in a pure democracy, all the people meet and take care of the government in person. In a Republic, they delegate that to representatives and deputies. That means that a democracy must be limited to a small geographical area, but a Republic can extend over a large region. . .
Why should we reject the experimental concept of an extended Republic simply because it might be a new idea? Isn't it the glory of the American people that, although we have respected the opinions of ancient times and other nations, we have never blindly worshiped antiquity, or traditions, or names so much that we ignored our own good sense, the knowledge of our own unique situation, and the lessons we've learned from our own experience? Future generations will be grateful for our courageous spirit because there will be so many innovations in America that favor personal rights and public happiness, and the whole world will appreciate our example.
Mary E Webster:
The argument seems to arise from confusing a republic with a democracy, applying to a republic theories drawn from the nature of a democracy. The distinction between these systems was previously discussed. In a democracy, the people meet and administer the government in person. In a republic, representatives and agents assemble and administer it. Consequently, a democracy will be confined to a small area. But a republic may be extended over a large region. . .
Why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it is a new concept? Is it not the glory of the American people that while they study and respect opinions of former times and other nations, they do not suffer from blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, allowing them to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? Posterity will be indebted to the American spirit for having and showing the world numerous innovations in favor of private rights and public happiness.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
Number 14 is not included in their book.
Marshall Overstedt:
I believe they mistake republics for democracies. The real difference between them is that, in a democracy the people meet and exercise government in person; in a republic they delegate it to elected representatives. Democracies, as a result, apply best to small nations. Republics can administer huge territories, like ours. . .
Why reject the experiment of an extended republic merely because it is new? Is it not our glory that, while we respect other times and systems, we will not overrule our good sense and the lessons of our own experience. Future generations will be indebted for the many innovations about to benefit private rights and public happiness.
Federalist Number 39
Original:
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a national, but a federal act. . .
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.
How I paraphrased it:
The foundation on which the government will be set is the consent and ratification [official approval] of the American people. They will choose delegated individuals who will be elected just for that purpose [to ratify the Constitution]. On the other hand, the consent and ratification won't be given by the people as a mass of individuals casting a popular vote. It will be done state by state, through individuals deliberating within the distinct and separate states they live in. Thus it will be the consent and ratification of the various States, which comes from the supreme authority in each State: the people themselves. Thus, ratifying the Constitution will be a federal [federation of parts] rather than a national [union of one large part] decision. . .
The direct election of the President will be done by the States, with the States that have larger populations having more representative power. The number of votes each State will have will be calculated using two factors, so that each State will be like a separate and co-equal sovereign society [each state will get two electoral college votes, just as they have two Senators], and, at the same time, each State will be like unequal members of the same society [larger states will have more electoral college votes, just like they have more Representatives]. The final decision [if no conclusive result can be determined from the Electoral College] will be made by the House of Representatives, but instead of different States getting as many votes as they have Representatives, each State will get one vote. Thus, the government outlined in new Constitution has features of both federal and national government.
Mary E Webster:
It appears that the Constitution is founded on the assent and ratification of the American people through deputies elected for the special service. This assent and ratification is not to be given by individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing distinct, independent States to which they respectively belong. The States are to assent and ratify, based on the authority of the people. Therefore, ratifying the Constitution will be a federal, not a national, act. . .
The executive power will derive from a compound source. The final election of the President is to be made by the States as political units. Their allotted votes are based on a compound ratio, considering each partly as distinct, coequal societies, and partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is made by that branch of the legislature consisting of national representatives but, in this particular act, they are thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct, coequal political bodies. As to its source of powers, the government appears to be of mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
In regard to the foundation of the new government, on one hand it appears to be founded on the agreement and ratification of the American People via representatives who were elected to the Convention for that special purpose. On the other hand, this agreement and ratification will be given by the People not as individuals of one nation, but as the citizens of each of their respective separate and independent states. Thus, this agreement and ratification of the new Constitution will ultimately be based on the agreement and ratification of the states, derived from the supreme authority in each state, which is the authority of the People themselves. Therefore, the act that will establish the Constitution will not be a National act, but a Federal act. . .
The election of the President will be conducted by the states in their political capacity (via the Electors, and according to the total number of Representatives and Senators each state has in Congress). The votes allotted to each state will be allotted according to a compound ratio, one that considers them both as distinct and co-equal sovereigntics (derived from their representation in the Senate), and also as unequal members of the same socicty (derived from their representation in the House of Representatives). The election itself will be carried out by Electors from each of the states, whose number shall be equal to the number of Representatives and Senators of that state in Congress (but will not include any current Representatives or Senators). This way, each state will have its own delegation, From this point of view, it appears that the government will have as many Federal characteristics as National ones.
Marshall Overstedt:
In answer, I point out that it will be the American people who will assent to and ratify the Constitution. Their approval will be put forward by representatives they elect for that purpose. In this, the people will act, not as subjects of one entire nation, but as citizens of the independent States that comprise their nation. Yes, it will be expressed in action by the States. But it will take place on their sovereign authority -- which is the authority of the people themselves. Therefore, the act establishing the Constitution will be a federal, not a national, act. . .
The President will be elected directly by the States. The votes allotted to them would be in a compound ratio, whereby they would be partly distinct, equal sovereignties and partly unequal members of a united sovereignty. Should there be a tie vote, the eventual election is to be made in the House of Representatives -- the legislative division consisting of the national representatives. But in this particular act they would be grouped in separate, coequal State delegations. This aspect of the plan makes the proposed government seem like a "mixed" federal/national assembly.
Gary Alder:
The Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America. This assent is to be given by delegates elected for this specific purpose. The ratification is not to be done by the people of the whole nation considered as one body but by the people in each state considered as separate independent entities. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act therefore establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act. . .
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The nomination of the presidential candidates is to be made by the states in their political characters. The electoral votes allotted to the states, are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and co-equal societies; partly as unequal members of the same society. The final election of the President is to be made by that branch of Congress which consists of the national representatives. In this election however, they are to be considered individual delegations from so many distinct and co-equal political bodies. From this view of the government, it appears to be of a mixed character possessing at least as many federal features as national features.
Federalist Number 51
Original:
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. . .
May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
How I paraphrased it:
What method should we resort to in order to maintain the necessary division of power among the different branches of government as specified in the Constitution? There's only one answer. Since we have found all of these exterior provisions [the voters themselves] to be inadequate, then the interior government must be carefully planned so that its different parts, by their mutual relationships, can be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. I won't attempt to fully explain this important concept, but I will make a few observations. Maybe my comments will place it in a clearer light and help us to form a more accurate assessment of the structure and principles of the government that was set up by the convention when they wrote up the Constitution. . .
But what if this absolute authority to negate [veto] the legislature could also have some kind of limited connection between this weaker executive branch [the president], and the weaker of the two legislative branches [the Senate] in such a way that the legislative branch could be encouraged to support the president's Constitutional rights without conceding its own legislative rights? I think these observations are based on fair and just principles. But if they're tested by applying them to several state constitutions, as well as applying them to the federal Constitution, then if they don't work well with with federal government, they'll be even less likely to work with a state government.
Mary E Webster:
What method should we use, then, to maintain the necessary partition of power between the different branches as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer is: all outside provisions are inadequate. Therefore, the government must be structured, designed, so that the three constitutional branches and their relationships will have the ability to keep each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations. They may place it in a clearer light. They may also help us judge the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. . .
Can not a solution to this absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker executive branch and the weaker side of the stronger legislative branch, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own branch? If these observations are based on just principles, as I persuade myself they are, and if they are applied as a criterion to the State constitutions and the federal Constitution, it will be found that, if the federal Constitution doesn't perfectly meet these principles, the State constitutions are infinitely less able to pass such a test.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
How will we maintain, in practice, the necessary separation of power between the Branches of government as laid out in the Constitution? Since all the provisions that describe each separate Branch are merely surface-level solutions, the defect must be corrected by arranging the interior structure of the government in such a way that the mutual relationships between each Branch will turn out to be the way in which each Branch is kept within its own appropriate limits. While I won't be presumptuous enough to attempt to fully develop such an important idea in this paper, I will hazard a few general points that will hopefully shed some light on the subject and enable us to correctly judge the principles and structure of the government proposed by the Convention. . .
Ist there some way to fix the difficulties involved in giving the Executive such an absolute and final veto power? Could it be fixed by a spelled-out connection between the weaker Executive Branch, and the weaker House of the stronger Congress, and in such a way that Congress could be made to respect the constitutional rights of the President and, at the same time, remain confident enough in its own rights? If these principles (which I am convinced are correct) were applied as a standard to the state constitutions and to the proposed Federal Constitution, I believe that, even if the Federal Constitution didn't perfectly comport with them, the state constitutions would be infinitely less capable of passing the same test.
Marshall Overstedt:
How will we maintain the separation of powers between branches that the Constitution requires? The only answer, as no external safeguards would suffice, is that the government must be internally structured so that the branches check and balance each other. I will try to place this important idea in a clear light so that we can correctly see and study the governmental principles and structure the convention has designed. . .
May not the lack of an absolute executive veto be filled by some "measured" connection between the relatively weak executive and the weaker chamber (the Senate) of the more powerful legislature, which may thus be led to support the executive's constitutional rights without compromising or endangering its own? If the principles supporting these observations are just, as I believe they are, we should apply the "veto" principle to both the State and federal constitutions. But if the federal law does not exactly conform to the State laws, the States will not be able to pass the test.
Federalist Number 70
Original:
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. . .
The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is one''; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.
How I paraphrased it:
In a free government, there will be inconveniences like this in the legislative branch [because the legislature is made up of many members], but it's not necessary to introduce that kind of potential for conflict in the executive branch, and it's also unwise. In fact, in the highest level of leadership, it's downright dangerous. In a legislature, being able to make hasty decisions is more of an evil than a benefit. The various opinions and clashing of parties in the legislative branch can sometimes obstruct beneficial plans, but they also encourage reflection, discussion, and caution. They also curb excesses in the majority. . .
The concept of attaching a council to the executive branch, like so many State constitutions do, comes from those who don't like the idea of a republic and assume that power is safer in the hands of a group of people rather than in the hands of a single individual. If that assumption could be applied to this case, I would still say that the advantages of dividing the executive branch wouldn't make up for the disadvantages. But, in any case, I don't think that applies to the executive power. I agree with the writer whom Junius referred to as 'profound, rational, and brilliant.' That writer said that 'the executive officer is more easily restrained when he is just one person.' It's a lot easier for the people to keep a watchful, wary eye on a single person. No matter how you look at it, multiple people sharing the executive office is more of a threat than a benefit to liberty.
Mary E Webster:
The principle of free government requires that the inconveniences just described must be tolerated from the legislature. But it is unnecessary and, therefore, unwise to introduce them into the executive branch. And they can be the most pernicious in the executive. In the legislature, prompt decisions are more often an evil than a benefit. Although the differences of opinion and party haggling can sometimes obstruct good plans, they often promote deliberation and circumspection, serving to check excesses in the majority. . .
The idea of a council to the Executive, which is in many State constitutions, has come from the maxim of republican jealousy, which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim is felt to be applicable to this case, I would argue that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule is at all applicable to the national executive power. I clearly concur with the opinion on this subject with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious, that the executive power is more easily confined when it is one." It is far safer to have a single object for jealousy and watchfulness of the people. And, in a word, all multiplication of the Executive is more dangerous than friendly to liberty.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
Number 70 is not included in their book.
Marshall Overstedt:
In the interests of free government, division and controversy must be part of the legislative process. But it is unwise to include them in the makeup of the Executive. In the legislature, a speedy decision is more often a bane than a benefit. Though differences of opinion and partisan jarrings in the legislature may sometimes obstruct the legislative process, they often also serve to check the majority's excesses. . .
The idea of a council to the Executive, so common in State constitutions, is derived from the antirepublicans' maxim that power is safer in a body than in a single man. If I were to admit the maxim applies to the case, I would argue that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the many disadvantages on the other. But I do not think the rule applies the Executive power. I believe executive power is more easily confined when it is in one person, that it is far safer to have one "target" for the people's jealousy and watchfulness and that executive plurality is more dangerous than friendly to liberty.
Federalist Number 78
Original:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. . .
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
How I paraphrased it:
Anyone who carefully reflects on the different branches of government must realize that in a government where the branches are separate from each other, the judicial branch will always be the least threat to the political rights that the Constitution protects because of the nature of the judicial's duties. It will be the least able to threaten or abuse those rights. The Executive distributes the honors, but also holds the sword of the community [he executes, or enforces, the laws that are passed]. The legislature [lawmaking branch] controls the money and determines the rules that manage the duties and rights of every citizen. But the judicial branch does not manage the sword or the money. It has no control over the strength of the people or their wealth. It isn't able to take any active resolution whatsoever. . .
That makes it their job to determine the Constitution's intended meaning, as well as the implications of any laws that the legislators pass. If there is a conflict between the Constitution and a law that gets passed, the Constitution takes precedence because it is the higher authority and is the most valid of the two. In other words, the Constitution should be preferred over any law, and the intention of the people should be preferred over the intentions of their representatives.
Mary E Webster:
Anyone who studies the different departments of governmental power must see that, when they are constitutionally separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution because it will have the least capacity to annoy and injure them. The executive not only dispenses honors but holds the community's sword. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, however, has no influence over either the sword or the purse. It directs neither the strength nor wealth of society. It can take no active resolution whatever. . .
Interpretation of the laws is the proper and specific province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. Therefore, the courts ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of specific legislative acts. If the two should happen to have an irreconcilable variance, the one with the superior obligation and validity should, of course, be preferred. Or, in other words, the Constitution should be preferred over the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
If you think carefully about the different Branches of power in a government in which the Branches are separate from each other, you must recognize that, from the nature of its function, the Judicial Branch will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution because it will be the Branch least capable of interfering with or endangering those rights. The Executive not only enforces the laws, but he also holds the sword of the nation, and the Legislature not only controls the public treasury, but also lays down the rules that regulate the rights and responsibilities of every citizen. The Judiciary, on the other hand, has no control over the sword or the treasury, it can neither direct the strength nor the wealth of society, and it is absolutely incapable of making laws that would go into effect immediately. . .
The interpretation of the law is the unique duty of courts and a constitution must be regarded by the judges as the fundamental law. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the judges to determine not just the meaning of the law, but also the meaning of any particular act of Congress. If there is an irreconcilable difference between the two, then the Constitution should be preferred over the law, and the intention of the People over the intention of their representatives.
Marshall Overstedt:
In governments that separate the branches, the judiciary is always the least dangerous to constitutional political rights because it has the least power to injure them. The Executive dispenses the community's honors and holds its sword. The legislature commands the purse and prescribes the rules that regulate citizens' duties and rights. But the judiciary has no such control or influence and can take no resolute action. . .
Interpreting the laws is the courts' proper, unique province. The judges must regard the Constitution as a fundamental law. They, therefore, own the power to determine the meaning of the Constitution and any legislative act. If the Constitution and an Act of Congress happen to conflict, the Constitution should be preferred to the statute: the people's intention is superior to the intentions of their agents.
If you're looking for a more modern, easy to read version of the Federalist papers, there are a few choices out there. I paraphrased eight of the Federalist Papers myself, and then read my paraphrase side by side with three other translations, and lined them up with the original, to see how each version compares. All of the ones I reviewed seemed to maintain the gist and spirit of the original article.
You can read all of them in their original language at Project Gutenberg or The Avalon Project.
My own paraphrase is here.
"The Federalist Papers in Modern Language" by Mary E. Webster (pdf; amazon)
"The Original Argument" by Joshua Charles and Glenn Beck (amazon)
"In Other Words" by Marshall Overstedt is a free 134-page PDF.
Gary Alder paraphrased Federalist #1 and Federalist #39.
Federalist Number 1
Original:
You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided.
How I paraphrased it:
It should be obvious to you that I lean towards supporting the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit that I've given the issue a lot of thought and I firmly believe that it is in your best interests to approve it. I think this is the best way to guarantee your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I'm not going to pretend to have sentiments that I don't really feel. I'm not going to pretend to mull over and deliberate over a decision that I've already made.
Mary E Webster:
I'm sure you have noticed that I am not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit that after having given it attentive consideration, I believe it is in your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I don't pretend to have reservations I don't feel. I won't amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
You will find that I am convinced that this Constitution will protect your liberty, dignity, and happiness and, therefore, believe that is in your interests to adopt it. I will not express any feelings to you other than my own, nor waste your time by debating what I have already decided for myself, since I will freely acknowledge my convictions and reasoning behind them.
Marshall Overstedt:
These thoughts are intended to alert you to dishonest objections -- while frankly admitting that I am "friendly" to the new Constitution: I believe ratification is the best way to achieve liberty and assure dignity and happiness.
Gary Alder:
You will, no doubt, realize that I am in favor of the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of the opinion that it is in your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I don't pretend anything which I do not feel. I will not make it appear that I have not made up my mind when I have decided.
Federalist Number 2
Original:
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter . . .
How I paraphrased it:
But this nation is made up of an intelligent people. They saw these defects and they regretted them. They were still as committed to union as they were committed to liberty. They saw the danger that threatened their Union, and might even threaten their liberty.
Mary E Webster:
Being intelligent, the people recognized and regretted the government's defects. They were both attached to the union and enamored with liberty. They observed that the union was in immediate danger, a danger that would eventually jeopardize liberty.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
The intelligent people of this country understood these problems and regretted their existence. During the war, when we were equally in love with both our Union and our liberties, we recognized the imminent danger to our Union more easily than the threat to our liberties.
Marshall Overstedt:
An intelligent people, we recognized and regretted these defects. Still attached to Union and liberty, we saw the immediate danger to the former and the more remote risk to the latter.
Federalist Number 10
Original:
Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. . .
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
How I paraphrased it:
Therefore, the number of representatives might not be in proportion to their constituents. But they will be proportionally greater in a smaller Republic [more representatives, less voters]. If we imagine a case where both the small and large Republic have the same number ratio of representatives [one representative per the same number of people], then the larger Republic will have more options [representatives], which will give a better chance of choosing someone competent. . .
If you widen their sphere, it will include a greater variety of parties and special interests, and that means that it will be harder to get up a majority who will have the same motive in common and be united to infringe on the rights of other citizens. If enough people do share a motive in common, it will be harder for all of those who feel it to be aware of how many strong they are, so they won't be as easily able to come together and act in unison. There are other obstacles, but whenever people have a sense that their motive is unjust or dishonorable, their tendency to reach out and connect with other like-minded people is hindered by their own distrust, and the more people are required to act, the more suspicious each individual will be about reaching out.
Mary E Webster:
Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases are not in the same proportion to their constituents, with the larger proportion in the small republic. If the proportion of qualified people is the same in a large as a small republic, the large republic will present greater options and, consequently, result in a greater probability of a fit choice. . .
Expanding the size adds a greater variety of parties and interests. It becomes less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens. Even if a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for those holding it to discover their combined strength and act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, when a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes exists, communication is limited by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
Since the number of representatives in both cases will not be proportional to the number of constituents (which would be proportionally the greatest in the small republ;ic), and since the proportion of worthy candidates is probably equal in the large as much as it is in the small republic, the larger republic will be the better option. . .
If you increase the number of people involved, you naturally increase the number of parties and interests involved, making it less likely that a majority of the People will have a common motive to invade the rights of their fellow citizens. Even if such a motive existed, it would be more difficult to find like-minded citizens, which would make acting in unison more difficult as well.In addition to other obstacles, it is also true that whenever people areaware of any unjust ot dishonorable motives on the part of others, their communication is always hindered by distrust, which takes place in proportion to the number of people whose agreement is required for any plan of action to move forward.
Marshall Overstedt:
Note that the number of representatives in each case is not in proportion to its constituency, and the small republic has a greater proportion. It follows that if the ratio of fit candidates in the large republic equals that in the small, the large republic will offer more choices a better chance to elect a qualified representative body. . .
But when you widen the fields of interest, including more people, more parties and diverse interests, you make it more difficult for a majority to violate the minority's rights. That limits a faction's opportunity and ability to function. For one reason, it takes many more people to gather critical mass and soon distrust and dissension begin to erode effectiveness.
Federalist Number 14
Original:
I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. . .
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness.
How I paraphrased it:
I will only add that this mistaken notion seems to come from a confusion between a Republic and a democracy, and from applying logic about the nature of a democracy to a Republic. The distinction between the two was also explained in a previous article. Basically, it is this: in a pure democracy, all the people meet and take care of the government in person. In a Republic, they delegate that to representatives and deputies. That means that a democracy must be limited to a small geographical area, but a Republic can extend over a large region. . .
Why should we reject the experimental concept of an extended Republic simply because it might be a new idea? Isn't it the glory of the American people that, although we have respected the opinions of ancient times and other nations, we have never blindly worshiped antiquity, or traditions, or names so much that we ignored our own good sense, the knowledge of our own unique situation, and the lessons we've learned from our own experience? Future generations will be grateful for our courageous spirit because there will be so many innovations in America that favor personal rights and public happiness, and the whole world will appreciate our example.
Mary E Webster:
The argument seems to arise from confusing a republic with a democracy, applying to a republic theories drawn from the nature of a democracy. The distinction between these systems was previously discussed. In a democracy, the people meet and administer the government in person. In a republic, representatives and agents assemble and administer it. Consequently, a democracy will be confined to a small area. But a republic may be extended over a large region. . .
Why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it is a new concept? Is it not the glory of the American people that while they study and respect opinions of former times and other nations, they do not suffer from blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, allowing them to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? Posterity will be indebted to the American spirit for having and showing the world numerous innovations in favor of private rights and public happiness.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
Number 14 is not included in their book.
Marshall Overstedt:
I believe they mistake republics for democracies. The real difference between them is that, in a democracy the people meet and exercise government in person; in a republic they delegate it to elected representatives. Democracies, as a result, apply best to small nations. Republics can administer huge territories, like ours. . .
Why reject the experiment of an extended republic merely because it is new? Is it not our glory that, while we respect other times and systems, we will not overrule our good sense and the lessons of our own experience. Future generations will be indebted for the many innovations about to benefit private rights and public happiness.
Federalist Number 39
Original:
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a national, but a federal act. . .
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.
How I paraphrased it:
The foundation on which the government will be set is the consent and ratification [official approval] of the American people. They will choose delegated individuals who will be elected just for that purpose [to ratify the Constitution]. On the other hand, the consent and ratification won't be given by the people as a mass of individuals casting a popular vote. It will be done state by state, through individuals deliberating within the distinct and separate states they live in. Thus it will be the consent and ratification of the various States, which comes from the supreme authority in each State: the people themselves. Thus, ratifying the Constitution will be a federal [federation of parts] rather than a national [union of one large part] decision. . .
The direct election of the President will be done by the States, with the States that have larger populations having more representative power. The number of votes each State will have will be calculated using two factors, so that each State will be like a separate and co-equal sovereign society [each state will get two electoral college votes, just as they have two Senators], and, at the same time, each State will be like unequal members of the same society [larger states will have more electoral college votes, just like they have more Representatives]. The final decision [if no conclusive result can be determined from the Electoral College] will be made by the House of Representatives, but instead of different States getting as many votes as they have Representatives, each State will get one vote. Thus, the government outlined in new Constitution has features of both federal and national government.
Mary E Webster:
It appears that the Constitution is founded on the assent and ratification of the American people through deputies elected for the special service. This assent and ratification is not to be given by individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing distinct, independent States to which they respectively belong. The States are to assent and ratify, based on the authority of the people. Therefore, ratifying the Constitution will be a federal, not a national, act. . .
The executive power will derive from a compound source. The final election of the President is to be made by the States as political units. Their allotted votes are based on a compound ratio, considering each partly as distinct, coequal societies, and partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is made by that branch of the legislature consisting of national representatives but, in this particular act, they are thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct, coequal political bodies. As to its source of powers, the government appears to be of mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
In regard to the foundation of the new government, on one hand it appears to be founded on the agreement and ratification of the American People via representatives who were elected to the Convention for that special purpose. On the other hand, this agreement and ratification will be given by the People not as individuals of one nation, but as the citizens of each of their respective separate and independent states. Thus, this agreement and ratification of the new Constitution will ultimately be based on the agreement and ratification of the states, derived from the supreme authority in each state, which is the authority of the People themselves. Therefore, the act that will establish the Constitution will not be a National act, but a Federal act. . .
The election of the President will be conducted by the states in their political capacity (via the Electors, and according to the total number of Representatives and Senators each state has in Congress). The votes allotted to each state will be allotted according to a compound ratio, one that considers them both as distinct and co-equal sovereigntics (derived from their representation in the Senate), and also as unequal members of the same socicty (derived from their representation in the House of Representatives). The election itself will be carried out by Electors from each of the states, whose number shall be equal to the number of Representatives and Senators of that state in Congress (but will not include any current Representatives or Senators). This way, each state will have its own delegation, From this point of view, it appears that the government will have as many Federal characteristics as National ones.
Marshall Overstedt:
In answer, I point out that it will be the American people who will assent to and ratify the Constitution. Their approval will be put forward by representatives they elect for that purpose. In this, the people will act, not as subjects of one entire nation, but as citizens of the independent States that comprise their nation. Yes, it will be expressed in action by the States. But it will take place on their sovereign authority -- which is the authority of the people themselves. Therefore, the act establishing the Constitution will be a federal, not a national, act. . .
The President will be elected directly by the States. The votes allotted to them would be in a compound ratio, whereby they would be partly distinct, equal sovereignties and partly unequal members of a united sovereignty. Should there be a tie vote, the eventual election is to be made in the House of Representatives -- the legislative division consisting of the national representatives. But in this particular act they would be grouped in separate, coequal State delegations. This aspect of the plan makes the proposed government seem like a "mixed" federal/national assembly.
Gary Alder:
The Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America. This assent is to be given by delegates elected for this specific purpose. The ratification is not to be done by the people of the whole nation considered as one body but by the people in each state considered as separate independent entities. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act therefore establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act. . .
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The nomination of the presidential candidates is to be made by the states in their political characters. The electoral votes allotted to the states, are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and co-equal societies; partly as unequal members of the same society. The final election of the President is to be made by that branch of Congress which consists of the national representatives. In this election however, they are to be considered individual delegations from so many distinct and co-equal political bodies. From this view of the government, it appears to be of a mixed character possessing at least as many federal features as national features.
Federalist Number 51
Original:
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. . .
May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
How I paraphrased it:
What method should we resort to in order to maintain the necessary division of power among the different branches of government as specified in the Constitution? There's only one answer. Since we have found all of these exterior provisions [the voters themselves] to be inadequate, then the interior government must be carefully planned so that its different parts, by their mutual relationships, can be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. I won't attempt to fully explain this important concept, but I will make a few observations. Maybe my comments will place it in a clearer light and help us to form a more accurate assessment of the structure and principles of the government that was set up by the convention when they wrote up the Constitution. . .
But what if this absolute authority to negate [veto] the legislature could also have some kind of limited connection between this weaker executive branch [the president], and the weaker of the two legislative branches [the Senate] in such a way that the legislative branch could be encouraged to support the president's Constitutional rights without conceding its own legislative rights? I think these observations are based on fair and just principles. But if they're tested by applying them to several state constitutions, as well as applying them to the federal Constitution, then if they don't work well with with federal government, they'll be even less likely to work with a state government.
Mary E Webster:
What method should we use, then, to maintain the necessary partition of power between the different branches as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer is: all outside provisions are inadequate. Therefore, the government must be structured, designed, so that the three constitutional branches and their relationships will have the ability to keep each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations. They may place it in a clearer light. They may also help us judge the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. . .
Can not a solution to this absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker executive branch and the weaker side of the stronger legislative branch, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own branch? If these observations are based on just principles, as I persuade myself they are, and if they are applied as a criterion to the State constitutions and the federal Constitution, it will be found that, if the federal Constitution doesn't perfectly meet these principles, the State constitutions are infinitely less able to pass such a test.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
How will we maintain, in practice, the necessary separation of power between the Branches of government as laid out in the Constitution? Since all the provisions that describe each separate Branch are merely surface-level solutions, the defect must be corrected by arranging the interior structure of the government in such a way that the mutual relationships between each Branch will turn out to be the way in which each Branch is kept within its own appropriate limits. While I won't be presumptuous enough to attempt to fully develop such an important idea in this paper, I will hazard a few general points that will hopefully shed some light on the subject and enable us to correctly judge the principles and structure of the government proposed by the Convention. . .
Ist there some way to fix the difficulties involved in giving the Executive such an absolute and final veto power? Could it be fixed by a spelled-out connection between the weaker Executive Branch, and the weaker House of the stronger Congress, and in such a way that Congress could be made to respect the constitutional rights of the President and, at the same time, remain confident enough in its own rights? If these principles (which I am convinced are correct) were applied as a standard to the state constitutions and to the proposed Federal Constitution, I believe that, even if the Federal Constitution didn't perfectly comport with them, the state constitutions would be infinitely less capable of passing the same test.
Marshall Overstedt:
How will we maintain the separation of powers between branches that the Constitution requires? The only answer, as no external safeguards would suffice, is that the government must be internally structured so that the branches check and balance each other. I will try to place this important idea in a clear light so that we can correctly see and study the governmental principles and structure the convention has designed. . .
May not the lack of an absolute executive veto be filled by some "measured" connection between the relatively weak executive and the weaker chamber (the Senate) of the more powerful legislature, which may thus be led to support the executive's constitutional rights without compromising or endangering its own? If the principles supporting these observations are just, as I believe they are, we should apply the "veto" principle to both the State and federal constitutions. But if the federal law does not exactly conform to the State laws, the States will not be able to pass the test.
Federalist Number 70
Original:
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. . .
The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is one''; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.
How I paraphrased it:
In a free government, there will be inconveniences like this in the legislative branch [because the legislature is made up of many members], but it's not necessary to introduce that kind of potential for conflict in the executive branch, and it's also unwise. In fact, in the highest level of leadership, it's downright dangerous. In a legislature, being able to make hasty decisions is more of an evil than a benefit. The various opinions and clashing of parties in the legislative branch can sometimes obstruct beneficial plans, but they also encourage reflection, discussion, and caution. They also curb excesses in the majority. . .
The concept of attaching a council to the executive branch, like so many State constitutions do, comes from those who don't like the idea of a republic and assume that power is safer in the hands of a group of people rather than in the hands of a single individual. If that assumption could be applied to this case, I would still say that the advantages of dividing the executive branch wouldn't make up for the disadvantages. But, in any case, I don't think that applies to the executive power. I agree with the writer whom Junius referred to as 'profound, rational, and brilliant.' That writer said that 'the executive officer is more easily restrained when he is just one person.' It's a lot easier for the people to keep a watchful, wary eye on a single person. No matter how you look at it, multiple people sharing the executive office is more of a threat than a benefit to liberty.
Mary E Webster:
The principle of free government requires that the inconveniences just described must be tolerated from the legislature. But it is unnecessary and, therefore, unwise to introduce them into the executive branch. And they can be the most pernicious in the executive. In the legislature, prompt decisions are more often an evil than a benefit. Although the differences of opinion and party haggling can sometimes obstruct good plans, they often promote deliberation and circumspection, serving to check excesses in the majority. . .
The idea of a council to the Executive, which is in many State constitutions, has come from the maxim of republican jealousy, which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim is felt to be applicable to this case, I would argue that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule is at all applicable to the national executive power. I clearly concur with the opinion on this subject with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious, that the executive power is more easily confined when it is one." It is far safer to have a single object for jealousy and watchfulness of the people. And, in a word, all multiplication of the Executive is more dangerous than friendly to liberty.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
Number 70 is not included in their book.
Marshall Overstedt:
In the interests of free government, division and controversy must be part of the legislative process. But it is unwise to include them in the makeup of the Executive. In the legislature, a speedy decision is more often a bane than a benefit. Though differences of opinion and partisan jarrings in the legislature may sometimes obstruct the legislative process, they often also serve to check the majority's excesses. . .
The idea of a council to the Executive, so common in State constitutions, is derived from the antirepublicans' maxim that power is safer in a body than in a single man. If I were to admit the maxim applies to the case, I would argue that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the many disadvantages on the other. But I do not think the rule applies the Executive power. I believe executive power is more easily confined when it is in one person, that it is far safer to have one "target" for the people's jealousy and watchfulness and that executive plurality is more dangerous than friendly to liberty.
Federalist Number 78
Original:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. . .
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
How I paraphrased it:
Anyone who carefully reflects on the different branches of government must realize that in a government where the branches are separate from each other, the judicial branch will always be the least threat to the political rights that the Constitution protects because of the nature of the judicial's duties. It will be the least able to threaten or abuse those rights. The Executive distributes the honors, but also holds the sword of the community [he executes, or enforces, the laws that are passed]. The legislature [lawmaking branch] controls the money and determines the rules that manage the duties and rights of every citizen. But the judicial branch does not manage the sword or the money. It has no control over the strength of the people or their wealth. It isn't able to take any active resolution whatsoever. . .
That makes it their job to determine the Constitution's intended meaning, as well as the implications of any laws that the legislators pass. If there is a conflict between the Constitution and a law that gets passed, the Constitution takes precedence because it is the higher authority and is the most valid of the two. In other words, the Constitution should be preferred over any law, and the intention of the people should be preferred over the intentions of their representatives.
Mary E Webster:
Anyone who studies the different departments of governmental power must see that, when they are constitutionally separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution because it will have the least capacity to annoy and injure them. The executive not only dispenses honors but holds the community's sword. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, however, has no influence over either the sword or the purse. It directs neither the strength nor wealth of society. It can take no active resolution whatever. . .
Interpretation of the laws is the proper and specific province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. Therefore, the courts ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of specific legislative acts. If the two should happen to have an irreconcilable variance, the one with the superior obligation and validity should, of course, be preferred. Or, in other words, the Constitution should be preferred over the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Joshua Charles/Glenn Beck:
If you think carefully about the different Branches of power in a government in which the Branches are separate from each other, you must recognize that, from the nature of its function, the Judicial Branch will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution because it will be the Branch least capable of interfering with or endangering those rights. The Executive not only enforces the laws, but he also holds the sword of the nation, and the Legislature not only controls the public treasury, but also lays down the rules that regulate the rights and responsibilities of every citizen. The Judiciary, on the other hand, has no control over the sword or the treasury, it can neither direct the strength nor the wealth of society, and it is absolutely incapable of making laws that would go into effect immediately. . .
The interpretation of the law is the unique duty of courts and a constitution must be regarded by the judges as the fundamental law. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the judges to determine not just the meaning of the law, but also the meaning of any particular act of Congress. If there is an irreconcilable difference between the two, then the Constitution should be preferred over the law, and the intention of the People over the intention of their representatives.
Marshall Overstedt:
In governments that separate the branches, the judiciary is always the least dangerous to constitutional political rights because it has the least power to injure them. The Executive dispenses the community's honors and holds its sword. The legislature commands the purse and prescribes the rules that regulate citizens' duties and rights. But the judiciary has no such control or influence and can take no resolute action. . .
Interpreting the laws is the courts' proper, unique province. The judges must regard the Constitution as a fundamental law. They, therefore, own the power to determine the meaning of the Constitution and any legislative act. If the Constitution and an Act of Congress happen to conflict, the Constitution should be preferred to the statute: the people's intention is superior to the intentions of their agents.
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