Federalist 32 Paraphrased
Federalist Number 32: The General Power of Taxation, Continued
One of the more frequently cited Federalist Papers.
by Alexander Hamilton
Jan 3, 1788
To: the people of New York,
The States fear that if the federal government is able to collect taxes, then they'll be able to control those States. I don't think that will happen. I'm convinced that the people have common sense, and the federal government knows better than to provoke any resentment from the States. Also, local governments would be better suited to collect taxes for local use. These points should provide a complete barrier against the federal government using taxation as a means to oppress the States. In all fairness, I'm willing to admit that it's perfectly reasonable for individual States to have the authority to collect taxes from their own citizens for the needs of their State. And I can confirm that, under the new Constitution, with the exception of duties on imports and exports, States will retain the absolute authority to collect their own taxes. Any attempt from the federal government to limit them in raising taxes would be a blatant power grab that is unsupported by any article or clause in the Constitution.
Grouping all the States together as one composite national sovereignty would mean that all of the States would be in submission to the central government, and whatever powers they might retain would depend on the wishes of the general national population. But the Constitution is only designed as a partial union, a limited consolidation. State governments will still have the same sovereignty rights they had before, except for specific rights that are reserved exclusively for the United States as a whole. There are only three cases where authority has been removed from State sovereignty: cases where the Constitution grants exclusive authority to the federal government; cases where it grants a specific authority to the Union in one instance, and prohibits States from having the same authority in another instance; and cases where it would be contradictory and conflicting for States to exercise the same authority where that authority has been granted to the Union. That last case might seem similar to the second case, but it's actually substantially different. I'm talking about a case where coexisting authorities might sometimes cause interference in the policy of an administration, but without directly contradicting or conflicting with any point of Constitutional authority. Here are illustrations of the three different cases. Clause 17 in Section 8 of Article 1 says that Congress has authority over a specific District that shall become the capitol of the United States. That would illustrate the first case. Clause 1 of the same section gives Congress the authority to "collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Clause 2 of section 10 of the same Article says that "States may not collect taxes or duties on imports or exports above what they need to pay for enforcing inspection laws, unless Congress approves." This gives the federal government the exclusive power to collect duties on imports and exports with the exception mentioned, but another clause limits that power by saying that the federal government may not collect taxes or duties on anything being exported from any of the States. Therefore, the federal government can only collect duties on imports from other countries. That illustrates the second case. The third case is found in the same Article, section 8, in the fourth Clause. It gives Congress the authority "to establish a consistent process for naturalization." Obviously, this authority has to belong exclusively to the federal government. If every State was able to make their own rules about who could become a US citizen, there could be no consistent rule.
One situation that might seem similar to the third case but is actually different affects the very issue we're talking about. That is the authority to tax all articles other than imports and exports. I assert that this is obviously a simultaneous and co-equal authority existing both in the federal government and in the individual States. There is nothing in the part of the Constitution that grants this authority to the Union that excludes the States from doing the same thing. In fact, one could argue that the way the States are specifically prohibited from collecting duties on imports and exports proves that collecting taxes is something the States are allowed to do. The particular restriction on collecting duties shows that, unless something is explicitly prohibited, the States are authorized to do it. States collecting taxes is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, implying that the States have as much authority as ever to collect taxes. Any other way of looking at it would be redundant and even dangerous: redundant because, if giving the Union the authority to collect duties implied that the States could not also collect duties, there would be no need to spell out a restriction on the States from collecting duties. And it would be dangerous because specifying the power to collect duties in the Constitution suggests that the States would be allowed to tax anything that the Constitution doesn't specifically prohibit, and, if our opponents are right, could never have been what we intended [but that actually is what was intended!]. In other words, in all instances where there is no specific restriction, the States still retain the authority to collect taxes.
The specific restriction on collecting duties is what lawyers call a "pregnant denial" of one thing, while affirming another thing. [Example: if a child says, 'I didn't get any candy' because he actually got a cookie.] I mean that specifically disallowing States to collect duties means they are allowed to collect other funds that aren't mentioned. It would be deceitful to say that the specified prohibition from collecting duties meant that States absolutely could not collect duties, but left them the authority to collect other money but only under the federal government's control. After all, the clause says that "States may not collect taxes or duties on imports or exports above what they need to pay for enforcing inspection laws, unless Congress approves." If we go by that last understanding, then it makes it sound like the Constitution has gone out of its way to write a formal clause for no reason. In essence, it means the Constitution has said, 'if the States have the consent of Congress, they're allowed to collect duties on imports and exports, and they can tax everything else, too, as long as it isn't controlled by the federal government.' If that was what was intended, then it would have made more sense to leave out the part giving the federal government the exclusive right to collect duties and simply leave the federal government with the authority to collect taxes in general. But that's obviously not what was meant, and trying to claim it says that is a stretch.
As far as there being an objection if both the federal government and the States have the authority to collect taxes, it doesn't make sense to deny States the ability to raise taxes. I suppose there might be a case where a State would tax a specific item, and it would make no sense for the federal government to tax the same thing, but that doesn't make it unconstitutional for States to collect taxes altogether. How to manage such situations would be questions that both sides would need to work out sensibly, but there's no conflict of power involved. A State's financial policy might sometimes be at odds with the federal policy, and would require mutual understanding on both sides. But a potential inconvenience in the use of authoritative powers isn't enough to imply that a right of sovereignty that was already in place can be cut off or stamped out. Only a Constitutional exclusion can do that.
The need to have co-existing authorities in certain cases is the result of dividing power. The Constitution says that any authority that is not specifically taken from the States and given to the Union remains fully with the States. That isn't merely a theoretical result of dividing the power. It's clearly outlined by the whole tone of the language in the new Constitution. Although the Constitution specifically gives certain powers to the Union, there has been the most careful diligence to stipulate which powers are not permitted to the States when it was judged necessary for those powers to belong exclusively to the federal government. Article 1 Section 10 * is full of such provisions. That fact should clearly show the intent of the men who drafted the Constitution, and it gives a rule by which to interpret the rest of the Constitution. It justifies the opinion I have stated in this essay, and should refute anyone who argues the opposite.
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
* For reference: The Constitution, Article I Section 10
Clause 1: No state is allowed to enter into any treaty or alliance with a foreign country. No state is allowed to give Letters of Marque and Reprisal make their own money, write promissory notes in order to buy on credit, take anything but silver and gold in payment of debts, pass a Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law, or any law that breaks a contract, and they may not bestow any titles of nobility.
Clause 2: States may not collect taxes or duties on imports or exports above what they need to pay for enforcing inspection laws, unless Congress approves. Any taxes or duties they collect on behalf of the U.S. Government must be given to the U.S. Treasury. All laws regarding their import and export taxes and duties can be revised and controlled by Congress.
Clause 3: Unless Congress approves, states may not charge duties on foreign ships, maintain an army or navy in peace time, negotiate agreements with other states or foreign countries, or wage war unless they are actually invaded or in such urgent danger that immediate action is necessary.
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, April 2020
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
One of the more frequently cited Federalist Papers.
by Alexander Hamilton
Jan 3, 1788
To: the people of New York,
The States fear that if the federal government is able to collect taxes, then they'll be able to control those States. I don't think that will happen. I'm convinced that the people have common sense, and the federal government knows better than to provoke any resentment from the States. Also, local governments would be better suited to collect taxes for local use. These points should provide a complete barrier against the federal government using taxation as a means to oppress the States. In all fairness, I'm willing to admit that it's perfectly reasonable for individual States to have the authority to collect taxes from their own citizens for the needs of their State. And I can confirm that, under the new Constitution, with the exception of duties on imports and exports, States will retain the absolute authority to collect their own taxes. Any attempt from the federal government to limit them in raising taxes would be a blatant power grab that is unsupported by any article or clause in the Constitution.
Grouping all the States together as one composite national sovereignty would mean that all of the States would be in submission to the central government, and whatever powers they might retain would depend on the wishes of the general national population. But the Constitution is only designed as a partial union, a limited consolidation. State governments will still have the same sovereignty rights they had before, except for specific rights that are reserved exclusively for the United States as a whole. There are only three cases where authority has been removed from State sovereignty: cases where the Constitution grants exclusive authority to the federal government; cases where it grants a specific authority to the Union in one instance, and prohibits States from having the same authority in another instance; and cases where it would be contradictory and conflicting for States to exercise the same authority where that authority has been granted to the Union. That last case might seem similar to the second case, but it's actually substantially different. I'm talking about a case where coexisting authorities might sometimes cause interference in the policy of an administration, but without directly contradicting or conflicting with any point of Constitutional authority. Here are illustrations of the three different cases. Clause 17 in Section 8 of Article 1 says that Congress has authority over a specific District that shall become the capitol of the United States. That would illustrate the first case. Clause 1 of the same section gives Congress the authority to "collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Clause 2 of section 10 of the same Article says that "States may not collect taxes or duties on imports or exports above what they need to pay for enforcing inspection laws, unless Congress approves." This gives the federal government the exclusive power to collect duties on imports and exports with the exception mentioned, but another clause limits that power by saying that the federal government may not collect taxes or duties on anything being exported from any of the States. Therefore, the federal government can only collect duties on imports from other countries. That illustrates the second case. The third case is found in the same Article, section 8, in the fourth Clause. It gives Congress the authority "to establish a consistent process for naturalization." Obviously, this authority has to belong exclusively to the federal government. If every State was able to make their own rules about who could become a US citizen, there could be no consistent rule.
One situation that might seem similar to the third case but is actually different affects the very issue we're talking about. That is the authority to tax all articles other than imports and exports. I assert that this is obviously a simultaneous and co-equal authority existing both in the federal government and in the individual States. There is nothing in the part of the Constitution that grants this authority to the Union that excludes the States from doing the same thing. In fact, one could argue that the way the States are specifically prohibited from collecting duties on imports and exports proves that collecting taxes is something the States are allowed to do. The particular restriction on collecting duties shows that, unless something is explicitly prohibited, the States are authorized to do it. States collecting taxes is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, implying that the States have as much authority as ever to collect taxes. Any other way of looking at it would be redundant and even dangerous: redundant because, if giving the Union the authority to collect duties implied that the States could not also collect duties, there would be no need to spell out a restriction on the States from collecting duties. And it would be dangerous because specifying the power to collect duties in the Constitution suggests that the States would be allowed to tax anything that the Constitution doesn't specifically prohibit, and, if our opponents are right, could never have been what we intended [but that actually is what was intended!]. In other words, in all instances where there is no specific restriction, the States still retain the authority to collect taxes.
The specific restriction on collecting duties is what lawyers call a "pregnant denial" of one thing, while affirming another thing. [Example: if a child says, 'I didn't get any candy' because he actually got a cookie.] I mean that specifically disallowing States to collect duties means they are allowed to collect other funds that aren't mentioned. It would be deceitful to say that the specified prohibition from collecting duties meant that States absolutely could not collect duties, but left them the authority to collect other money but only under the federal government's control. After all, the clause says that "States may not collect taxes or duties on imports or exports above what they need to pay for enforcing inspection laws, unless Congress approves." If we go by that last understanding, then it makes it sound like the Constitution has gone out of its way to write a formal clause for no reason. In essence, it means the Constitution has said, 'if the States have the consent of Congress, they're allowed to collect duties on imports and exports, and they can tax everything else, too, as long as it isn't controlled by the federal government.' If that was what was intended, then it would have made more sense to leave out the part giving the federal government the exclusive right to collect duties and simply leave the federal government with the authority to collect taxes in general. But that's obviously not what was meant, and trying to claim it says that is a stretch.
As far as there being an objection if both the federal government and the States have the authority to collect taxes, it doesn't make sense to deny States the ability to raise taxes. I suppose there might be a case where a State would tax a specific item, and it would make no sense for the federal government to tax the same thing, but that doesn't make it unconstitutional for States to collect taxes altogether. How to manage such situations would be questions that both sides would need to work out sensibly, but there's no conflict of power involved. A State's financial policy might sometimes be at odds with the federal policy, and would require mutual understanding on both sides. But a potential inconvenience in the use of authoritative powers isn't enough to imply that a right of sovereignty that was already in place can be cut off or stamped out. Only a Constitutional exclusion can do that.
The need to have co-existing authorities in certain cases is the result of dividing power. The Constitution says that any authority that is not specifically taken from the States and given to the Union remains fully with the States. That isn't merely a theoretical result of dividing the power. It's clearly outlined by the whole tone of the language in the new Constitution. Although the Constitution specifically gives certain powers to the Union, there has been the most careful diligence to stipulate which powers are not permitted to the States when it was judged necessary for those powers to belong exclusively to the federal government. Article 1 Section 10 * is full of such provisions. That fact should clearly show the intent of the men who drafted the Constitution, and it gives a rule by which to interpret the rest of the Constitution. It justifies the opinion I have stated in this essay, and should refute anyone who argues the opposite.
Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."
* For reference: The Constitution, Article I Section 10
Clause 1: No state is allowed to enter into any treaty or alliance with a foreign country. No state is allowed to give Letters of Marque and Reprisal make their own money, write promissory notes in order to buy on credit, take anything but silver and gold in payment of debts, pass a Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law, or any law that breaks a contract, and they may not bestow any titles of nobility.
Clause 2: States may not collect taxes or duties on imports or exports above what they need to pay for enforcing inspection laws, unless Congress approves. Any taxes or duties they collect on behalf of the U.S. Government must be given to the U.S. Treasury. All laws regarding their import and export taxes and duties can be revised and controlled by Congress.
Clause 3: Unless Congress approves, states may not charge duties on foreign ships, maintain an army or navy in peace time, negotiate agreements with other states or foreign countries, or wage war unless they are actually invaded or in such urgent danger that immediate action is necessary.
Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, April 2020
All Federalist Paper paraphrases
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