Federalist 57 Paraphrased

Federalist No. 57 - Does the Proposed Constitution's System of Representation Elevate a Few at the Expense of Everyone Else?     paraphrased into modern English

by Alexander Hamilton, February 19, 1788

To: the People of the State of New York:

The third criticism against the House of Representatives is that Representatives will come from the class of citizens that has the least in common with the majority of the people. That will make them more likely to sacrifice the rights of the people to elevate their own ambitions. Of all the criticisms that have been made against the proposed Constitution, this is probably the most surprising.

The complaint is aimed at some supposed oligarchy [elite ruling class], but the essence of it attacks the very foundation of republican government itself. The goal of every political constitution should be, first of all, to place men in positions of leadership who have the wisdom for identifying, and the character for seeking out what's best for the common good of society. A constitution should also take the most efficient precautions for keeping those leaders honest while they're in positions of public trust. Electing leaders is a defining aspect of republican government. There are many and varied methods in a republican government for preventing leaders from becoming corrupt. The most effective one is to limit the time a person can serve to a period that will ensure that they maintain an appropriate responsibility to the people who voted for them. I ask, where in the proposed Constitution does it lay out guidelines for the House of Representatives in such a way that it violates the principles of republican [representative] government, or promotes the advancement of a few at the expense of everyone else? In fact, doesn't every guideline actually conform very strictly to the principles of a republican form of government, and stay carefully neutral and fair-minded regarding the rights and ambitions of all classes and types of citizens? Look at who the constitution appoints as electors of representatives to the Federal government -- the poor as well as the rich; the uneducated as well as scholars; the humble descendants of unknown families with little fortunes as well as the proud heirs from distinguished families. Electors will come from the immense multitude of the United States citizens themselves. They will be the same ones who elect the members of their own state's House of Representatives. Who is allowed to run for these offices? Any citizen whose excellence earns him the respect and confidence of his countrymen. There is no requirement of wealth, family status, religion, or career that can disqualify him if the people want to vote for him. If we consider the kind of men who are freely elected by their fellow citizens to represent them, we'll see that every safeguard that can be arranged or needed has been put in place to make them loyal to the constituents who voted for them. First of all, since their fellow citizens have recognized their worth by voting for them, we can assume that they must have the attributes that qualify them for the position, and they are likely to be conscientious and sincere about their duties. Secondly, they will begin their term of public service feeling some affection for their constituents who honored them with their votes. Each elected official will recognize that he has been given a distinction of honor, approval, great respect, and confidence. In addition to the other aspects of his position, he will feel a sense of gratefulness and obligation to those who voted for him.

Ingratitude is a common charge too quickly brought against human nature, but we have to admit that there are too many disgraceful examples in private lives and in politics. The strong universal indignation against it proves how passionately people value a grateful spirit.

Third, the bond that connects a representative to his constituents is strengthened by a slightly more selfish impulse. His own pride and conceit make him appreciate a form of government that promotes his ambition and allows him to have a share of honors and importance. There may be a few ambitious politicians who harbor hopes for personal glory or their own pet projects, but it's going to be more common for politicians who are voted in by the people to want to continue to be popular with their voters so they can continue to advance, rather than change the government in order to sabotage the authority of the people. But even all of these safeguards wouldn't be very sufficient without the obstacle of frequent elections. So, fourth, the House of Representatives is designed to make sure the Representatives never forget how much they depend on the people who vote for them. Before they have enough time for their grateful feelings of obligation to the voters who put them in their position to fade as they become accustomed to having power, it will be time to start thinking about the end of their term. They will need to reflect on how they wielded their power, and consider going home to the community they came from for good, unless they have done their job so faithfully that the people trust them enough to vote them back to continue as their representative. Specific to the House of Representatives, I'll add a fifth measure that restrains them from becoming too oppressive: they are not allowed to make any law that doesn't apply to them and their friends as much as the great mass of society. This has always been considered one of the strongest human bonds that connects rulers and people together. It creates a unity of interests and a shared feeling of position that few governments can claim. Without this bond, every government deteriorates into tyranny. If you ask, 'what's to keep the House of Representatives from making laws that favor themselves and a specific class of society?' I will answer: The brilliance of the system itself, the tendency of fair and constitutional laws, and, most of all, the watchful and vibrant spirit that drives the American people. This spirit cultivates freedom, and in return, is cultivated by freedom. If this spirit ever becomes so corrupted that it tolerates a law that applies to the people but not to the legislature, then it means the people are ready to put up with anything except liberty. That's the kind of relationship that will exist between the House of Representatives and their constituents. Responsibility, gratitude, well-being, and ambition itself are the chords that will bind the Representatives to the great mass of the people with bonds of loyalty and sympathy.

Perhaps all of this won't be enough to control the inconsistency and wickedness of people. But those are the only measures that are appropriate for a government to have, and human wisdom can't create any better safeguards. They are the legitimate and distinctive ways that all republican governments use to maintain the liberty and happiness of the people. In fact, they're the exact same measures that every State government in the Union relies on to attain those same ends. What is the cause, then, of the criticisms addressed in this paper? How are we supposed to respond to men who claim to have the most passionate love for republican government, yet brazenly disapprove of its most foundational principles? These men pretend to defend what's right and promote the ability of the people to choose their own leaders, yet they protest that the people will only elect politicians who will immediately and inevitably betray the confidence that was entrusted to them. If their criticisms could be heard by someone who had never read how the proposed Constitution lays out the method of choosing Representatives, he would assume that some unreasonable qualification, such as ownership of property, was attached to the right to vote. Or perhaps only people from certain distinguished families or wealth were allowed to vote. Or, at the very least, they would assume that the sensible methods of choosing Representatives outlined in State constitutions had not been followed. I've already mentioned how wrong the first two points are. The last point is even more wrong. The only noticeable difference between the two cases [electing state and federal representatives] is that United States Representatives will be elected by five or six thousand citizens, while State representatives are elected by only five or six hundred. Is this difference enough to approve of the method in state governments, while scorning the same method in the federal government? If this is the sticking point behind so much criticism, let's consider it. Is it a reasonable objection supported by logic?

It's only logical if five or six thousand voters are less capable of electing a competent Representative, or more likely to be deceived by an unsuitable one, than five or six hundred voters. But reason convinces us that a greater number of voters would be more likely to elect a suitable Representative, and they would be less likely to be misled into voting for someone else by the schemes of ambitious men or bribes of rich people. If our logic is wrong, are we willing to accept what that would mean? If we decide that five or six hundred citizens are the limit to how many people are allowed to collectively exercise their right to vote, wouldn't that deprive the rest of the people of their ability to directly choose their representatives in every instance when the government doesn't require a representative for so few people? Is this concept confirmed by facts? In the previous Federalist Paper (56) we showed that, in the British House of Commons, the actual ratio of representation is only a little more than one representative for every 30,000 citizens. England has various reasons that don't exist here in the United States for encouraging the formality of ancestral status and wealth. No one in Britain is eligible to be a county representative unless he owns enough property to earn six hundred pounds sterling a year, or to be a city or borough representative unless he owns an estate that can earn three hundred pounds sterling a year. Additionally, in the county elections, only those who have a freehold estate [land that can be passed on to descendants] with an annual value of twenty pounds sterling are eligible to vote. Yet even with these obstacles, and in spite of some unequal laws in the British law books, no one could say that England's representatives have promoted the advancement of a few at the expense of everyone else. But why should we rely on the experience of foreign countries? Our own experience is obvious and clear. In New Hampshire, where state senators are chosen directly by the people, the senatorial districts are almost as large as the districts that will be necessary for their federal representatives in Congress. The districts in Massachusetts are larger than necessary, and the districts in New York are even larger than that.

In New York, members of the Assembly [state representatives] for New York City and Albany are elected by almost as many voters as would be entitled to a federal Representative in Congress, if you calculate according to their 65 representatives. It doesn't matter that in New York's senatorial districts, more than one representative is selected by each elector at the same time. If those electors are capable of choosing four or five representatives at one time, why wouldn't they be capable of choosing just one? Pennsylvania is another example. Some of her counties that elect state senators are almost as large as her districts that elect federal representatives. Philadelphia, for instance, probably has between 50,000-60,000 people, so it will form almost two representative districts. Yet it only makes up one county, and every voter in that county will vote for each of its state representatives. And something that is more directly relevant to our purpose, the entire city of Philadelphia elects a single person to the state's executive council. And this is true of all the counties in Pennsylvania. These facts prove that the accusations against the House of Representatives are not true. Consider the state senators in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York. Or reflect on the executive council of Pennsylvania, or the members of the state assemblies in Massachusetts and New York. Have any of them manifested any tendency to sacrifice what's best for the many to advance the few? Are those people less worthy of their positions in any way than the representatives and civil servants who are appointed in other states by smaller numbers of people? But I have even more conclusive cases than these.

Connecticut has one branch of their legislature that's designed so that every member is voted on by the entire state. The governors of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York as well as the president of New Hampshire are also elected by their entire states. Decide for yourselves whether any of these circumstances give grounds that choosing Representatives by a large number of voters has a tendency to put traitors in positions of power and is likely to undermine the liberty of the people.

Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."

Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, February, 2021

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