Federalist 71 Paraphrased

Federalist No. 71 - The Length of the President's Term     paraphrased into modern English

by Alexander Hamilton, March 18, 1788

To: The people of New York:

I mentioned before that having a long enough term in office was the second thing needed to protect the authority of the Executive office. There are two reasons for this: to reinforce the individual holding the office of President as he executes his constitutional powers, and to add stability to the administrative people he appoints. As far as the first [reinforcing the President], it should be obvious that the longer his term lasts, the more likely his authority will be respected. It's a general truth of human nature that the more secure a man feels in his position, the more interested he'll be in that position. The more temporary or unsettled his position, the less attached he'll be to it. He'll be willing to risk more for something that means more to him. This is as true for a political office as it is for any material possession. In other words, if a man has a political office and knows he'll have to leave it in a very short period of time, he won't care enough about that office to risk severe criticism or stressful difficulties that might come from standing up for his principles, or facing hostility, even briefly, from the public or the dominant party in the legislature. If he has a chance of continuing in that office by getting re-elected, his ambition to succeed combined with his fear of criticism will be even more likely to corrupt his integrity or undermine his courage. Both scenarios mean the office is likely to be characterized with weakness and indecision.

Some people think that a President who tends to give in to the popular opinions of the people or the legislature is a good thing. But people who think that way don't have the right ideas about the actual ways to promote public happiness, or the purposes of government. A representative republic means that the public's opinions should guide the elected officials they chose to represent them, but it doesn't mean that public officials are obligated obey every fleeting whim or sudden idea that people can be manipulated into by those who try to influence their sentiments and undermine what's legitimately in their best interests. I've observed that most people genuinely want what's best for everyone. Even the mistakes they make are often made with the best intentions at heart. But their common sense makes them distrust flatterers who pretend to always have the best plans of promoting what's in the public interest. Their own experience tells them that they aren't perfect themselves, and they're surprised they don't make more mistakes than they do as a result of being influenced by the manipulations of parasites and flunkies, by the traps of ambitious, greedy, and desperate men, by the tricks of men who have more confidence than they've earned, and by men who strive to have more than they deserve. When situations come up where what's truly best for the people contrasts with what they've been convinced want, it becomes the duty of the politicians the people elected to guard their best interests to resist their temporary misconception in order to give the people time to come to their senses and think more rationally. I could point out specific instances when wise politicians saved the people from the disastrous consequences of their own misjudgment, earning them enduring gratitude as courageous men who were noble enough to do the right thing even when they risked displeasing the public.

But even if we tend to think the President should give in to the whims of the people, it would be unwise for him to give in to the whims of the legislature. There might be times when the legislators disagree with the people. Other times, the people may be completely neutral. In either case, it would be preferable for the President to be free to do what he thinks is best, and to do it boldly and decisively.

The same principle that shows the wisdom of keeping the different branches of government separate also shows that the branches should be arranged so that they can be independent of each other. What's the use of separating the executive branch or the judicial branch from the legislature if either the President or the judges are set up to be subservient to the legislature? That kind of separation would be separation in name only, and could never achieve the purpose it was set up for. Being submitted to the law doesn't mean being dependent on the legislature. The first one conforms to the basic principles of good government, but the second violates those principles and, regardless of what kind of Constitution is in effect, puts all the power into the hands of one branch. We have already written in previous Federalist papers about the tendency of the legislature to grasp more authority. In purely representative republican governments, this tendency is almost irresistible. In a popular assembly, the representatives of the people seem to have the opinion that they are the people themselves, and become impatient and annoyed at the least sign of disagreement, no matter who or where it comes from. They act as if any time the President or Supreme Court exercise their rights, it's a breach of their own authority and a sign of disrespect. They seem like they'd like to exercise a tyrannical control over the other two branches, and since they have the people [from their home states] on their side, they act with so much drive that it's difficult for the rest of the government to keep the powers of government in Constitutional balance.

Someone might wonder how a shorter term in office would make the executive branch more independent of the legislative branch unless one had the authority to appoint or dismiss the other. One answer comes from something already mentioned: a person isn't going to have much interest in a position he'll only have for a short period of time. He's not likely to put himself to any inconvenience or risk for that position. Another answer is no more conclusive, but is more obvious: the legislature will have more influence over the people [because they can appeal to their voters back home in their states]. That influence could be used to prevent a man from being re-elected if the legislators resent the President for standing boldly against any sinister plans they might have.

Someone might ask whether four years is a brief enough length of time to meet this purpose. Would an even shorter period of time be a better security against ambitious evil plans? No, because any less would be too short to inspire the President to have the firmness and independence he would need to do his job.

We can't be sure that four years, or any other number of years, for that matter, would work perfectly, but four years should be enough to have a positive influence on the spirit and character of the government. Four years isn't long enough for a man with a reasonable amount of backbone to be tempted to encroach on the other branches of government. During that time, he would feel that there was enough time to to make the community realize how beneficial the measures were that he wanted to enact. Yet it's also likely that, as the time came closer for the public to show their approval or disapproval when they vote for his re-election, his confidence and determination would decline. But he would be encouraged in the time he had left to earn the approval and regard of the voters. If he’s re-elected, he could move ahead with his plans, since his re-election would be evidence that the public trusts in his wisdom and integrity, and that he has their respect and loyalty. So, while four years is long enough to give the President enough authority to move ahead with firmness, it's not long enough to give him time to jeopardize the public's liberty. The House of Commons in England, who only had enough authority to approve or disapprove of new taxes, was able to quickly diminish the power of the monarchy and the privileges of the nobles to the limit where the country had a free government, and they were able to raise themselves to have equal authority with the House of Lords. In a single instance, they were able to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy and overturn all of the archaic institutions in both the Church and the government. They were able to make the monarchy uneasy when they proposed a change (Charles James Fox's India Bill of 1783; it didn't pass the House of Lords). If the House of Commons was able to exert this much power with no other tool than the ability to approve or disapprove taxes, imagine the House of Representatives wielding their similar power over a U.S. President who only served for four years, and whose authority was limited. That President might not be able to do the job the Constitution has assigned him. I will only add one more thing -- if four years isn't long enough to give him the firmness he needs, it's at least brief enough to prevent him from encroaching on the other branches.

Signed, "Publius Valerius Publicola."

Paraphrased by Leslie Noelani Laurio, April, 2021

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